From: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
To: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, alex@alex.org.uk
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.6] nbd: Don't kill server on client that doesn't request TLS
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2016 15:46:42 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <57100FC2.5070703@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <571006BC.3070603@redhat.com>
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On 04/14/2016 03:08 PM, Max Reitz wrote:
> On 07.04.2016 22:29, Eric Blake wrote:
>> Upstream NBD is documenting that servers MAY choose to operate
>> in a conditional mode, where it is up to the client whether to
>> use TLS. For qemu's case, we want to always be in FORCEDTLS
>> mode, because of the risk of man-in-the-middle attacks, and since
>> we never export more than one device; likewise, the qemu client
>> will ALWAYS send NBD_OPT_STARTTLS as its first option. But now
>> that SELECTIVETLS servers exist, it is feasible to encounter a
>> (non-qemu) client that does not do NBD_OPT_STARTTLS first, but
>> rather wants to take advantage of the conditional modes it might
>> find elsewhere.
>>
>> Since we require TLS, we are within our rights to drop connections
>> on any client that doesn't negotiate it right away, or which
>> attempts to negotiate it incorrectly, without violating the intent
>> of the NBD Protocol. However, it's better to allow the client to
>> continue trying, on the grounds that maybe the client will get the
>> hint to send NBD_OPT_STARTTLS.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> +++ b/nbd/server.c
>> @@ -450,9 +450,12 @@ static int nbd_negotiate_options(NBDClient *client)
>>
>> default:
>> TRACE("Option 0x%x not permitted before TLS", clientflags);
>> + if (nbd_negotiate_drop_sync(client->ioc, length) != length) {
>> + return -EIO;
>> + }
>> nbd_negotiate_send_rep(client->ioc, NBD_REP_ERR_TLS_REQD,
>> clientflags);
>> - return -EINVAL;
>> + break;
>> }
>
> What about NBD_OPT_EXPORTNAME? The specification says that this option
> does not allow for errors, and so the session must be terminated if this
> option is sent in FORCEDTLS mode without TLS having been negotiated.
Oh, good catch. v2 coming up.
--
Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-14 21:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-07 20:29 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH for-2.6] nbd: Don't kill server on client that doesn't request TLS Eric Blake
2016-04-07 22:32 ` Alex Bligh
2016-04-14 15:25 ` Eric Blake
2016-04-14 15:43 ` Alex Bligh
2016-04-14 21:08 ` Max Reitz
2016-04-14 21:46 ` Eric Blake [this message]
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