From: James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Daniel J Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
SELinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: Trying to setup a type bounds from unconfined_t and docekr_t to svirt_lxc_net_t
Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2016 11:05:55 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <572226D3.8060800@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <805268ee-75d6-4c43-7014-2dc7dd5ae01e@redhat.com>
On 04/28/2016 09:15 AM, Daniel J Walsh wrote:
>
> typebounds unconfined_t docker_t; # docker_t is an unconfined domain
>
> typebounds docker_t spc_t; #spc_t is an unconfined domain
>
> typeboulds docker_t docker_lxc_net_t;
>
>
> docker, rkt, systemd-nspawn, runc are all executing setexeccon(svirt_lxc_net_t)
>
> For container domains.
>
> Everything works fine until I turn on expand_check in semanage.conf, which we
> have been asked to do in Rawhide.
>
>
> Attached is the current Rawhide docker policy. And here is the output from
> semodule -i before it crashes, with a segfault.
>
The segfault has been fixed in upstream if you are able to pull in fixes at this
point.
>
> Had to add this rule to make it a little quieter, which is caused by a rule in
> policy that says we allow all daemons to connecto spc_t;
>
> gen_require(`
> type unconfined_t;
> attribute daemon;
> ')
>
> allow daemon unconfined_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
>
>
> Why does typebounds care about when a domain is the target of an access, I think
> it should only remove options when it is the source.
>
This has always been the behavior. Whether that is the desirable behavior is a
different question. To fix this would require changes in both the kernel and
userspace.
> Otherwise we end up having to loosen the policy to make this work.
>
>
> As long as docker_t does not have any more "allow docker_t" rules then "allow
> unconfined_t", shouldn't this be ok?
>
For your case, this seems to make sense.
> It seems that some or the optional code blocks are causing problems also.
>
What problem are you having with optional blocks? Maybe the bounds error
reporting is just confusing.
The following is showing a trace from the root of the policy down to the actual
rule. I find it helpful, but maybe it is confusing to others.
<root>
optional at line 4356 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
optional at line 4651 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
optional at line 5414 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
optional at line 5494 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
optional at line 6180 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
optional at line 6192 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
booleanif at line 6201 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
true at line 6202 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
allow at line 6205 of /var/lib/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/init/cil
Jim
--
James Carter <jwcart2@tycho.nsa.gov>
National Security Agency
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-04-28 15:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-04-28 13:15 Trying to setup a type bounds from unconfined_t and docekr_t to svirt_lxc_net_t Daniel J Walsh
2016-04-28 14:24 ` Dominick Grift
2016-04-28 15:05 ` James Carter [this message]
2016-04-28 15:21 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-04-28 16:20 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-04-28 17:31 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-04-28 17:35 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-04-28 17:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-04-28 18:07 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-04-28 18:36 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-04-29 8:19 ` Miroslav Grepl
2016-04-29 12:21 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-04-28 16:21 ` Daniel J Walsh
2016-04-29 15:48 ` Stephen Smalley
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