From: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] x86/time: correctly honor late clearing of TSC related feature flags
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 11:44:47 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5899B32F.2000907@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5899B3CA02000078001372E3@prv-mh.provo.novell.com>
On 02/07/2017 10:47 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 07.02.17 at 11:27, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>> On 06/02/17 08:39, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>> As such clearing of flags may have an impact on the selected rendezvous
>>> function, defer the establishing of a rendezvous function other than
>>> the initial default one (std) until after all APs have been brought up.
>>>
>>> But don't allow such feature flags to be cleared during CPU hotplug:
>>> Platform and local system times may have diverged significantly by
>>> then, potentially causing noticeably (even if only temporary) strange
>>> behavior. As we're anyway expecting only sufficiently similar CPUs to
>>> appear during hotplug, this shouldn't be introducing new limitations.
>>>
>>> Reported-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>>
>> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>
> Thanks.
>
>>> ---
>>> v3: Drop original approach entirely - defer everything to
>>> verify_tsc_reliability(), making for quite a bit smaller a patch.
>>>
>>> Note: Considering that tsc_check_writability() checks
>>> TSC_RELIABLE, it being run before that feature flag has obtained
>>> its final value seems problematic too. Should we defer that call
>>> too?
>>
>> Do we know which CPUs this applies to? Might we be safe by being only
>> 64bit these days?
>
> amd.c sets it when ITSC and model != 0x11, which I think includes
> 64-bit CPUs. intel.c sets it unconditionally when ITSC. However, I
> don't see how all this matters, as we clear it as the result of the
> TSC warp producing a non-zero tsc_max_warp, and that check is
> purely a software thing.
Considering that TSC_RELIABLE bit (or the lack of it) is only truly valid after
tsc reliability checks have been done, then it probably makes sense to move the
writability check after verify_tsc_reliability (or at the end of it) one as you
seem to hint above.
Joao
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-02-07 11:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-06 8:39 [PATCH v3] x86/time: correctly honor late clearing of TSC related feature flags Jan Beulich
2017-02-07 10:27 ` Andrew Cooper
2017-02-07 10:47 ` Jan Beulich
2017-02-07 11:44 ` Joao Martins [this message]
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