From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch v2 4/4] x86/speculation: Add prctl to control indirect branch speculation per process
Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2018 11:12:23 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5a558b4e-e241-2ab8-3653-b25dc014b78d@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1810021949450.1435@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
On 10/02/2018 10:58 AM, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Tue, 25 Sep 2018, Tim Chen wrote:
>>
>> +void arch_set_dumpable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
>> +{
>> + if (!static_branch_unlikely(&spectre_v2_app_lite))
>> + return;
>> + if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
>> + return;
>> +
>> + if ((unsigned) value != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
>
> First of all we use unsigned int and not unsigned, Aside of that why is the
> argument not unsigned int right away?
The original set_dumpable passes suid_dumpable, which was
exposed via /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable and defined as int.
It will make sense to define suid_dumpable as an unsigned int instead.
Would you like me to redefine suid_dumpable as unsigned int
in sysctl.c in the patch revision as a separate clean up patch?
Thanks.
Tim
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-05 18:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-26 0:43 [Patch v2 0/4] Provide options to enable spectre_v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 1/4] x86/speculation: Option to select app to app mitigation for spectre_v2 Tim Chen
2018-10-02 9:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 16:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-02 20:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 2/4] x86/speculation: Provide application property based STIBP protection Tim Chen
2018-10-02 19:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-04 19:19 ` Tim Chen
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 3/4] x86/speculation: Extend per process STIBP to AMD cpus Tim Chen
2018-09-26 17:24 ` Tim Chen
2018-09-26 19:11 ` Lendacky, Thomas
2018-10-02 9:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 19:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-09-26 0:43 ` [Patch v2 4/4] x86/speculation: Add prctl to control indirect branch speculation per process Tim Chen
2018-10-02 9:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 16:12 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-03 7:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-10-02 17:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-05 18:12 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-10-05 18:46 ` Thomas Gleixner
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