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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: paul@paul-moore.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
	penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, mic@digikod.net
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data
Date: Fri, 21 Apr 2023 12:20:22 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6442e1f7.620a0220.b44ce.7a42@mx.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230421174259.2458-3-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 10:42:50AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> As LSMs are registered add their lsm_id pointers to a table.
> This will be used later for attribute reporting.
> 
> Determine the number of possible security modules based on
> their respective CONFIG options. This allows the number to be
> known at build time. This allows data structures and tables
> to use the constant.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Nit below...

> [...]
> @@ -513,6 +531,15 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
>  {
>  	int i;
>  
> +	if (lsm_active_cnt >= LSM_COUNT)
> +		panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__);
> +	/*
> +	 * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more
> +	 * than once. Landlock is one such case.
> +	 */
> +	if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid)
> +		lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid;
> +

I find this logic hard to parse. I think this might be better, since
lsm_idlist will be entirely initialized to LSM_UNDEF, yes?

	/*
	 * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more
	 * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization
	 * is serialized. Landlock is one such case.
	 */
	if (lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt] != lsmid)
		lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid;


-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2023-04-21 19:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20230421174259.2458-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2023-04-21 17:42 ` [PATCH v9 00/11] LSM: Three basic syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 01/11] LSM: Identify modules by more than name Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:14     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 02/11] LSM: Maintain a table of LSM attribute data Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:20     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2023-04-27 15:31       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-23  8:04     ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 03/11] proc: Use lsmids instead of lsm names for attrs Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:21     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 04/11] LSM: syscalls for current process attributes Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:36     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-26  1:12       ` Casey Schaufler
2023-04-22 13:12     ` kernel test robot
2023-04-22 16:59     ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 05/11] LSM: Create lsm_list_modules system call Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:38     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 06/11] LSM: wireup Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:38     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 07/11] LSM: Helpers for attribute names and filling an lsm_ctx Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:46     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 08/11] Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:49     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 09/11] AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:54     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-22  1:23     ` kernel test robot
2023-04-22 14:55     ` kernel test robot
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 10/11] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 19:57     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-21 17:42   ` [PATCH v9 11/11] LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls Casey Schaufler
2023-04-21 20:01     ` Kees Cook
2023-04-27 16:00       ` Casey Schaufler

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