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From: syzbot <syzbot+f363afac6b0ace576f45@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] [net?] WARNING in sock_map_destroy
Date: Sun, 29 Sep 2024 00:43:00 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <66f90504.050a0220.aab67.0011.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <000000000000abe6b50620a7f370@google.com>

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***

Subject: Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] [net?] WARNING in sock_map_destroy
Author: dmantipov@yandex.ru

#syz test: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net.git d505d3593b52b6c43507f119572409087416ba28

 From 12b932f214f0caaaa79f929ab81b46ebea125a06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 14:21:20 +0300
Subject: [PATCH net v2] net: sockmap: avoid race between sock_map_destroy() and
  sk_psock_put()

Syzbot has triggered the following race condition:

On CPU0, 'sk_psock_drop()' (most likely scheduled from 'sock_map_unref()'
called by 'sock_map_update_common()') is running at [1]:

void sk_psock_drop(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock)
{
         write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
         sk_psock_restore_proto(sk, psock);                              [1]
         rcu_assign_sk_user_data(sk, NULL);                              [2]
         ...
}

If 'sock_map_destroy()' is scheduled on CPU1 at the same time, psock is
always NULL at [3]. But, since [1] may be is in progress during [4], the
value of 'saved_destroy' at this point is undefined:

void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk)
{
         void (*saved_destroy)(struct sock *sk);
         struct sk_psock *psock;

         rcu_read_lock();
         psock = sk_psock_get(sk);                                       [3]
         if (unlikely(!psock)) {
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 saved_destroy = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->destroy;        [4]
         } else {
                 saved_destroy = psock->saved_destroy;                   [5]
                 sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock);
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 sk_psock_stop(psock);
                 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
         }
         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_destroy == sock_map_destroy))
                 return;
         if (saved_destroy)
                 saved_destroy(sk);
}

Fix this issue in 3 steps:

1. Prefer 'sk_psock()' over 'sk_psock_get()' at [3]. Since zero
    refcount is ignored, 'psock' is non-NULL until [2] is completed.

2. Add read lock around [5], to make sure that [1] is not in progress
    when the former is executed.

3. Since 'sk_psock()' does not adjust reference counting, drop
    'sk_psock_put()' and redundant 'sk_psock_stop()' (which is
    executed by 'sk_psock_drop()' anyway).

Fixes: 5b4a79ba65a1 ("bpf, sockmap: Don't let sock_map_{close,destroy,unhash} call itself")
Reported-by: syzbot+f363afac6b0ace576f45@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f363afac6b0ace576f45
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov@yandex.ru>
---
  net/core/sock_map.c | 6 +++---
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index d3dbb92153f2..1eeb1d3a6b71 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -1649,16 +1649,16 @@ void sock_map_destroy(struct sock *sk)
  	struct sk_psock *psock;

  	rcu_read_lock();
-	psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
+	psock = sk_psock(sk);
  	if (unlikely(!psock)) {
  		rcu_read_unlock();
  		saved_destroy = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot)->destroy;
  	} else {
+		read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
  		saved_destroy = psock->saved_destroy;
+		read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
  		sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock);
  		rcu_read_unlock();
-		sk_psock_stop(psock);
-		sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
  	}
  	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(saved_destroy == sock_map_destroy))
  		return;
-- 
2.46.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-09-29  7:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-27 10:46 [syzbot] [bpf?] [net?] WARNING in sock_map_destroy syzbot
2024-09-29  7:42 ` [syzbot] " syzbot
2024-09-29  7:43 ` syzbot [this message]
2024-09-29  7:43 ` syzbot
2024-09-29  9:26 ` syzbot
2024-09-29  9:28 ` syzbot
2024-09-29  9:28 ` syzbot

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