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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-pci@vger.kernel.org>,
	<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, <aik@amd.com>,
	<aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>, <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	<bhelgaas@google.com>, <alistair23@gmail.com>, <lukas@wunner.de>,
	<jgg@nvidia.com>, Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 08/19] PCI/TSM: Add "evidence" support
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 18:45:24 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <69b8b234177ea_452b1001a@dwillia2-mobl4.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260314111245.76d18d73@kernel.org>

Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Mon,  2 Mar 2026 16:01:56 -0800 Dan Williams wrote:
> > The implementation adheres to the guideline from:
> > Documentation/userspace-api/netlink/genetlink-legacy.rst
> > 
> >     New Netlink families should never respond to a DO operation with
> >     multiple replies, with ``NLM_F_MULTI`` set. Use a filtered dump
> >     instead.
> 
> My understanding of F_MULTI is that deserializer is supposed to
> continue deserializing into current object. IOW if we have:
> 
> struct does_this {
> 	int really;
> 	int have_to;
> 	int be_netlink;
> };

Heh, sensing a subtle message here...

> You can send "really" and "be_netlink" in one message and "have_to" 
> in the next, and receiver should reconstruct them into a single struct.
> 
> If F_MULTI is not set - receiver assumes that the next message is a new
> struct. And the whole dump returns a list of structs.
> 
> So IOW I think what you're doing is a bit too.. inventive.

Fair, but see below, satisfying the requirements here are stuck in the
liminal space between sysfs and netlink... 

> Do you have plans to add more commands? 

Yes, future work like teaching the kernel how to cache device evidence
and re-challenge a device after error or power-loss recovery [1]. It may
even supplant some sysfs interfaces that would be better with
transactional semantics.

For example, a LOCK operation that returns a session cookie and a
RUN/ACCEPT operation that only succeeds if the session has not been
invalidated in the interim. sysfs would require userspace locking for
such a semantic.

[1]: http://lore.kernel.org/69a9de4791667_6423c1006c@dwillia2-mobl4.notmuch

> The read-only stuff feels like it could be a sysfs API?

In fact, the original genesis of a proposal in this space was sysfs back
at Plumbers 2024 [2].

As the number of attributes, modifiers, and transactions grew the
feedback in the BoF was to move to a more suitable uAPI, netlink.

Yes, a subset of the objects here could move to sysfs [3], but that does
relieve the main need here which is an interface that can dump a fresh
copy of the device measurements (settings and device data up to 16MB in
size), signed by the device, with a nonce provided by relying party
(userspace).

[2]: https://lpc.events/event/18/contributions/1955/
[3]: http://lore.kernel.org/20260219124119.GD723117@nvidia.com

> The main strength of Netlink is "do" commands with multiple optional
> attrs.

Yes, that is attractive and saves a pile of bug prone ioctl handling.

The gap I need to fill first though is a uAPI that allows for large
blobs to be fetched after being regenerated / reformatted besed on some
input attributes.

"Multi message netlink attributes" while inventive, feels less awkward
and more future proof than a sysfs binary attribute scheme to do the
same.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-17  1:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-03  0:01 [PATCH v2 00/19] PCI/TSM: TEE I/O infrastructure Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] PCI/TSM: Report active IDE streams per host bridge Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:36   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-04-07 16:02   ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] device core: Fix kernel-doc warnings in base.h Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:39   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-12 14:45     ` Greg KH
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] device core: Introduce confidential device acceptance Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:42   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-12 14:44   ` Greg KH
2026-03-13  4:11     ` Dan Williams
2026-03-13 12:18       ` Greg KH
2026-03-13 18:53         ` Dan Williams
2026-03-13 19:07           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-13 13:32       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-13 19:56         ` Dan Williams
2026-03-13 20:24           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-14  1:32             ` Dan Williams
2026-03-23 18:14               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-24  2:18                 ` Dan Williams
2026-03-24 12:36                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-25  4:13                     ` Dan Williams
2026-03-25 11:56                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-26  1:27                         ` Dan Williams
2026-03-26 12:00                           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-26 15:00                             ` Greg KH
2026-03-26 18:31                             ` Dan Williams
2026-03-26 19:28                               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] modules: Document the global async_probe parameter Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] device core: Autoprobe considered harmful? Dan Williams
2026-03-09 16:58   ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] PCI/TSM: Add Device Security (TVM Guest) LOCK operation support Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] PCI/TSM: Add Device Security (TVM Guest) ACCEPT " Dan Williams
2026-03-03  7:15   ` Baolu Lu
2026-04-10  8:44   ` Lai, Yi
2026-04-10  8:53   ` Lai, Yi
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] PCI/TSM: Add "evidence" support Dan Williams
2026-03-03  3:14   ` kernel test robot
2026-03-03 10:16   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-03 16:38   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-13 10:07   ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-13 18:06     ` Dan Williams
2026-03-14 18:12   ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-17  1:45     ` Dan Williams [this message]
2026-03-19  0:00       ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-20  2:50         ` Dan Williams
2026-03-17 18:14     ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-18  7:56       ` Dan Williams
2026-03-23 18:18         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-14 18:37   ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-16 20:13     ` Dan Williams
2026-03-16 23:02       ` Dan Williams
2026-03-17 14:13         ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-18  7:22           ` Dan Williams
2026-03-17 18:24   ` Lukas Wunner
2026-03-18  7:41     ` Dan Williams
2026-04-24 10:15       ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] PCI/TSM: Support creating encrypted MMIO descriptors via TDISP Report Dan Williams
2026-03-04 17:14   ` dan.j.williams
2026-03-13  9:57     ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-05  4:46   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-13 10:23     ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-13 13:36       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-17  5:13         ` Xu Yilun
2026-03-24  3:26           ` Dan Williams
2026-03-24 12:38             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-09  7:48         ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-16  5:19       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-23 18:20         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-26 23:38           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-27 11:49             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-30  5:47               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-30 11:49                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-03 12:41                   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-04-03 14:08                     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-06 22:08                       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-04-06 22:21                         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-08  7:03                           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-04-08 16:54                             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-04-08 22:22                               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-04-08 23:56                                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] x86, swiotlb: Teach swiotlb to skip "accepted" devices Dan Williams
2026-03-03  9:07   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-13 10:26     ` Xu Yilun
2026-04-09  7:33   ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-03  0:01 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] x86, dma: Allow accepted devices to map private memory Dan Williams
2026-03-03  7:36   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] x86, ioremap, resource: Support IORES_DESC_ENCRYPTED for encrypted PCI MMIO Dan Williams
2026-03-19 15:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] samples/devsec: Introduce a PCI device-security bus + endpoint sample Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] samples/devsec: Add sample IDE establishment Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] samples/devsec: Add sample TSM bind and guest_request flows Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] samples/devsec: Introduce a "Device Security TSM" sample driver Dan Williams
2026-03-27  8:44   ` Lai, Yi
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] tools/testing/devsec: Add a script to exercise samples/devsec/ Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] samples/devsec: Add evidence support Dan Williams
2026-03-03  0:02 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] tools/testing/devsec: Add basic evidence retrieval validation Dan Williams
2026-03-03  9:23 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] PCI/TSM: TEE I/O infrastructure Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-03-03 22:01   ` dan.j.williams

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