From: syzbot ci <syzbot+cibd4edd60e2329298@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, cwang@multikernel.io,
hemanthmalla@gmail.com, jakub@cloudflare.com,
jiayuan.chen@linux.dev, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com,
zijianzhang@bytedance.com
Cc: syzbot@lists.linux.dev, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: [syzbot ci] Re: tcp: opportunistic loopback splice for BPF-paired sockets
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 15:10:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6a2c83c3.428ffe26.258b27.015f.GAE@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260612011452.134466-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
syzbot ci has tested the following series
[v1] tcp: opportunistic loopback splice for BPF-paired sockets
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260612011452.134466-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
* [RFC PATCH bpf-next 1/5] tcp_bpf: add bpf_sock_splice_pair kfunc for opportunistic loopback splice
* [RFC PATCH bpf-next 2/5] tcp_bpf: busy-poll the splice ring before parking the receiver
* [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/5] selftests/bpf: add tcp_splice basic round-trip test
* [RFC PATCH bpf-next 4/5] bpf: allow SO_BUSY_POLL in bpf_setsockopt()
* [RFC PATCH bpf-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: set SO_BUSY_POLL from the tcp_splice sockops prog
and found the following issues:
* WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in tcp_bpf_recvmsg
* WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in tcp_bpf_splice_sendmsg
Full report is available here:
https://ci.syzbot.org/series/7c43d5ae-cb19-4b2b-96ad-f7f0806ac63c
***
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in tcp_bpf_recvmsg
tree: bpf-next
URL: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git
base: 30dee2c176e7954f63d1fa3e52d172f30beb9bfb
arch: amd64
compiler: Debian clang version 21.1.8 (++20251221033036+2078da43e25a-1~exp1~20251221153213.50), Debian LLD 21.1.8
config: https://ci.syzbot.org/builds/09e43fc4-ebab-492e-b1de-15bb86aa4588/config
syz repro: https://ci.syzbot.org/findings/79db1500-f71c-4550-8525-89bf06044d60/syz_repro
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:883 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by syz.0.17/5822.
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5822 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6876
sk_psock_is_spliced net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:883 [inline]
tcp_bpf_recvmsg+0x1780/0x1980 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:405
sock_recvmsg_nosec+0xee/0x140 net/socket.c:1137
____sys_recvmsg+0x3e3/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2916
___sys_recvmsg+0x215/0x590 net/socket.c:2960
do_recvmmsg+0x334/0x800 net/socket.c:3055
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3129 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3152 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3145 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x198/0x250 net/socket.c:3145
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1af799ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1af87bc028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1af7c15fa0 RCX: 00007f1af799ce59
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000200000000400 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1af7a32d6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000010051 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f1af7c16038 R14: 00007f1af7c15fa0 R15: 00007ffdef205588
</TASK>
***
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in tcp_bpf_splice_sendmsg
tree: bpf-next
URL: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git
base: 30dee2c176e7954f63d1fa3e52d172f30beb9bfb
arch: amd64
compiler: Debian clang version 21.1.8 (++20251221033036+2078da43e25a-1~exp1~20251221153213.50), Debian LLD 21.1.8
config: https://ci.syzbot.org/builds/09e43fc4-ebab-492e-b1de-15bb86aa4588/config
syz repro: https://ci.syzbot.org/findings/8144de7d-1a2e-454e-ab17-08d1c6586df2/syz_repro
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
syzkaller #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:883 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by syz.2.19/5817.
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5817 Comm: syz.2.19 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6876
sk_psock_is_spliced net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:883 [inline]
tcp_bpf_splice_sendmsg+0x1165/0x1490 net/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:897
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:787 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:802 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x80a/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2698
___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2752
__sys_sendmmsg+0x27c/0x4e0 net/socket.c:2841
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2868 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2865 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xc0 net/socket.c:2865
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fd1c339ce59
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd1c42e3028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd1c3615fa0 RCX: 00007fd1c339ce59
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000200000001000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fd1c3432d6f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000004008005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fd1c3616038 R14: 00007fd1c3615fa0 R15: 00007ffdcdbac378
</TASK>
***
If these findings have caused you to resend the series or submit a
separate fix, please add the following tag to your commit message:
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
syzbot ci engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
To test a patch for this bug, please reply with `#syz test`
(should be on a separate line).
The patch should be attached to the email.
Note: arguments like custom git repos and branches are not supported.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-12 22:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-12 1:14 [RFC PATCH bpf-next 0/5] tcp: opportunistic loopback splice for BPF-paired sockets Cong Wang
2026-06-12 1:14 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 1/5] tcp_bpf: add bpf_sock_splice_pair kfunc for opportunistic loopback splice Cong Wang
2026-06-12 1:33 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 2:10 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-06-12 1:14 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 2/5] tcp_bpf: busy-poll the splice ring before parking the receiver Cong Wang
2026-06-12 3:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 1:14 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 3/5] selftests/bpf: add tcp_splice basic round-trip test Cong Wang
2026-06-12 1:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 1:14 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 4/5] bpf: allow SO_BUSY_POLL in bpf_setsockopt() Cong Wang
2026-06-12 1:14 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 5/5] selftests/bpf: set SO_BUSY_POLL from the tcp_splice sockops prog Cong Wang
2026-06-12 1:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 16:01 ` [RFC PATCH bpf-next 0/5] tcp: opportunistic loopback splice for BPF-paired sockets Alexei Starovoitov
2026-06-12 18:12 ` Cong Wang
2026-06-12 18:34 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-06-12 20:17 ` Cong Wang
2026-06-13 17:57 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-06-13 21:25 ` Cong Wang
2026-06-12 22:10 ` syzbot ci [this message]
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