All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrea Cervesato via ltp <ltp@lists.linux.it>
To: "Li Wang" <li.wang@linux.dev>
Cc: Linux Test Project <ltp@lists.linux.it>
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH v5] coredump01: New core_pattern specifiers test
Date: Fri, 04 Sep 2026 06:25:44 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6a9a6469.3d30ac2e.110181.4b84@mx.google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <apo-YSqDGDNbrzcc@linux.dev>

Hi Li,

> > +	TST_EXP_PASS(access(dump, F_OK), "core.%%e.%%p.%%s expanded to core.coredump01.%d.%d",
> > +		     pid, SIGABRT);
> 
> Generally this checks is really nice, but it'd be better to
> add more checks for the core dump file?
> 
> e.g. file size > 0, ELF magic valid, and type == ET_CORE.

this is already done, but we can introduce ELF type check (read below).

> 
> FYI:
> 
> +static int verify_core_dump(const char *path, long long expected_size)
> +{
> +       int fd;
> +       struct stat st;
> +       unsigned char magic[SELFMAG];
> +       Elf64_Ehdr ehdr;

Ehdr is not portable on 32 bit systems breaking our testing, so I
wouldn't use it in this case. We need Elf32_Half which is in both
32bit and 64bit.

> +
> +       if (access(path, F_OK) != 0) {
> +               tst_res(TFAIL, "Core dump file %s does not exist", path);
> +               return -1;
> +       }
> +       tst_res(TPASS, "Core dump file %s exists", path);
> +
> +       SAFE_STAT(path, &st);
> +       TST_EXP_EXPR(st.st_size > 0, "core file size = %ld bytes", st.st_size);
> +
> +       if (expected_size > 0 && st.st_size != expected_size) {
> +               tst_res(TFAIL, "Core dump size mismatch: expected %lld bytes, got %ld",
> +                       expected_size, st.st_size);
> +               return -1;
> +       }
> +
> +       fd = SAFE_OPEN(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
> +       SAFE_READ(0, fd, magic, SELFMAG);
> +       SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> +       TST_EXP_EXPR(!memcmp(magic, ELFMAG, 4),
> +                       "core file has valid ELF magic");
> +
> +       fd = SAFE_OPEN(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
> +       SAFE_READ(0, fd, &ehdr, sizeof(ehdr));
> +       SAFE_READ(0, fd, &ehdr, sizeof(ehdr));

double read? I guess it's an error

I will send a new version with some of the proposed checks

--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com

-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

  reply	other threads:[~2026-09-04  6:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-03  7:21 [LTP] [PATCH v5] coredump01: New core_pattern specifiers test Andrea Cervesato
2026-09-03 12:01 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-09-04  3:43 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Li Wang
2026-09-04  6:25   ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp [this message]
2026-09-04  6:52     ` Li Wang

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=6a9a6469.3d30ac2e.110181.4b84@mx.google.com \
    --to=ltp@lists.linux.it \
    --cc=andrea.cervesato@suse.com \
    --cc=li.wang@linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.