From: syzbot <syzbot+56ad4cdaff8716472033@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: acme@kernel.org, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, irogers@google.com,
james.clark@linaro.org, jolsa@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org,
mark.rutland@arm.com, mingo@redhat.com, namhyung@kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: [syzbot] [perf?] KASAN: slab-use-after-free Read in put_ctx
Date: Sun, 15 Nov 2026 16:45:23 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6afa5223.78cd6c47.117a81.0013.GAE@google.com> (raw)
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 475a0cfd02f1 Merge branch 'bpf-sockmap-fixes-for-verdicts-..
git tree: bpf
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1501d4d9580000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=d44b06612b68f56
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=56ad4cdaff8716472033
compiler: Debian clang version 22.1.8 (1~deb13u4), Debian LLD 22.1.8
Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/27c237a7a126/disk-475a0cfd.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/fe240926e3c0/vmlinux-475a0cfd.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/ed961ae7e546/bzImage-475a0cfd.xz
AI-generated root cause summary:
In put_ctx() (kernel/events/core.c), when refcount_dec_and_test(&ctx->refcount)
returns false, the caller enters the else branch after already dropping its
reference to struct perf_event_context without holding an RCU read lock.
Concurrently, another thread (e.g., an exiting task in
perf_event_exit_task_context()) can drop the final reference, causing
call_rcu(&ctx->rcu_head, free_ctx) to be invoked. Once the RCU grace period
completes and free_ctx() frees the context via kfree(), any preempted or delayed
thread resuming in put_ctx() accesses ctx->task at line 1394 on already-freed
memory, triggering a slab-use-after-free.
full analysis: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/ai_root_cause?x=56ad4cdaff8716472033
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+56ad4cdaff8716472033@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in put_ctx+0xb4/0x1d0 kernel/events/core.c:1394
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in put_ctx+0xb4/0x1d0 kernel/events/core.c:1394
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807abdfd28 by task syz.3.460/8324
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8324 Comm: syz.3.460 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/06/2026
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description+0x55/0x1e0 mm/kasan/report.c:378
print_report+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
put_ctx+0xb4/0x1d0 kernel/events/core.c:1394
__free_event+0x4f6/0x790 kernel/events/core.c:5817
put_event kernel/events/core.c:5936 [inline]
perf_event_release_kernel+0x40e/0x4c0 kernel/events/core.c:6046
perf_release+0x38/0x50 kernel/events/core.c:6056
__fput+0x408/0xa40 fs/file_table.c:512
fput_close_sync+0x11f/0x240 fs/file_table.c:618
filp_close_sync+0x6e/0xa0 fs/open.c:1573
close_files fs/file.c:572 [inline]
put_files_struct+0x230/0x3c0 fs/file.c:584
do_exit+0x6f0/0x2360 kernel/exit.c:977
__do_sys_exit kernel/exit.c:1090 [inline]
__se_sys_exit kernel/exit.c:1088 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit+0x40/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1088
x64_sys_call+0x18b4/0x18d0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:61
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f38d41a8f19
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f38d41a8eef.
RSP: 002b:00007f38d4ff7fd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000003c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f38d4426090 RCX: 00007f38d41a8f19
RDX: 00007f38d4ff89c8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007f38d4237f6d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f38d4426128 R14: 00007f38d4426090 R15: 00007ffce1039d08
</TASK>
Allocated by task 8313:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:409 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:426
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x31c/0x600 mm/slub.c:5680
_kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:991 [inline]
_kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1312 [inline]
alloc_perf_context kernel/events/core.c:5082 [inline]
find_get_context+0xc7/0x860 kernel/events/core.c:5152
__do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:14200 [inline]
__se_sys_perf_event_open+0xc40/0x1ee0 kernel/events/core.c:14031
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 8338:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:264 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:296
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2780 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:6630 [inline]
kfree+0x1c5/0x650 mm/slub.c:6923
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2650 [inline]
rcu_core+0x92e/0x1230 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2919
handle_softirqs+0x265/0x8d0 kernel/softirq.c:669
__do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:703 [inline]
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:542 [inline]
__irq_exit_rcu+0xc6/0x220 kernel/softirq.c:786
irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:809
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa6/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x3e/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57
kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbd/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:556
__call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3287 [inline]
call_rcu+0x86/0x300 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3395
perf_event_exit_task_context+0x68e/0x7c0 kernel/events/core.c:14819
perf_event_exit_task+0x232/0x3a0 kernel/events/core.c:14848
do_exit+0x69b/0x2360 kernel/exit.c:959
do_group_exit+0x22d/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:1123
get_signal+0x136a/0x1430 kernel/signal.c:3113
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xbb/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
__exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:66 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x10e/0x770 kernel/entry/common.c:101
__exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:207 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/irq-entry-common.h:230 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:343 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x328/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807abdfc00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
The buggy address is located 296 bytes inside of
freed 512-byte region [ffff88807abdfc00, ffff88807abdfe00)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88807abdf800 pfn:0x7abdc
head: order:2 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000000240(workingset|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 00fff00000000240 ffff88813ff28c80 ffffea00014a5110 ffffea000074ba10
raw: ffff88807abdf800 0000000000100008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000240 ffff88813ff28c80 ffffea00014a5110 ffffea000074ba10
head: ffff88807abdf800 0000000000100008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 00fff00000000002 ffffffffffffff01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000004
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2040(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 5277, tgid 5277 (S30dbus), ts 49489599498
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:33 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f9/0x250 mm/page_alloc.c:1856
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1864 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x220f/0x2280 mm/page_alloc.c:3935
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x1fe/0x410 mm/page_alloc.c:5444
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3384 [inline]
allocate_slab+0x7d/0x5e0 mm/slub.c:3499
new_slab mm/slub.c:3550 [inline]
refill_objects+0x2d5/0x350 mm/slub.c:7539
refill_sheaf mm/slub.c:2917 [inline]
__pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2c8/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:4811
alloc_from_pcs mm/slub.c:4887 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5021 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5530 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x476/0x710 mm/slub.c:5556
_kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:995 [inline]
_kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1312 [inline]
tomoyo_init_log+0x1a6b/0x1f60 security/tomoyo/audit.c:273
tomoyo_supervisor+0x35f/0x1550 security/tomoyo/common.c:2232
tomoyo_audit_path_number_log security/tomoyo/file.c:239 [inline]
tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x463/0x5f0 security/tomoyo/file.c:739
security_file_ioctl+0xc3/0x2a0 security/security.c:2533
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:591 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x47/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
page last free pid 5003 tgid 5003 ts 41185611989 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:26 [inline]
__free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1403 [inline]
__free_frozen_pages+0xc97/0xd90 mm/page_alloc.c:2954
__slab_free+0x269/0x2c0 mm/slub.c:5926
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x99/0x100 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:361
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4720 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5033 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2b4/0x600 mm/slub.c:5047
lsm_file_alloc security/security.c:172 [inline]
security_file_alloc+0x34/0x310 security/security.c:2428
init_file+0x90/0x2b0 fs/file_table.c:184
alloc_empty_file+0x74/0x1d0 fs/file_table.c:266
path_openat+0x96/0x20f0 fs/namei.c:5002
do_file_open+0x23e/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:5045
do_sys_openat2+0x115/0x200 fs/open.c:1442
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1448 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1464 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1459 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1459
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88807abdfc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88807abdfc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88807abdfd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff88807abdfd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88807abdfe00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
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reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 0:45 UTC|newest]
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