From: syzbot ci <syzbot+ci6f245d1507e04332@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: syzkaller-upstream-moderation@googlegroups.com
Cc: syzbot@lists.linux.dev
Subject: [moderation/CI] Re: keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:53:28 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <6afe9ce8.92f98041.20636d.0001.GAE@google.com> (raw)
syzbot ci has tested the following series
[v1] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261115121722.206-1-enscrpt@pm.me
* [PATCH] keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key
and found the following issue:
possible deadlock in key_move
Full report is available here:
https://ci.syzbot.org/series/51455b74-3344-42d0-9ba7-b64be2ff0b40
***
possible deadlock in key_move
tree: torvalds
URL: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux
base: 4405c18c95d2d0f99f6c581ef0ee8591a1aa6ccd
arch: amd64
compiler: Debian clang version 22.1.8 (1~deb13u4), Debian LLD 22.1.8
config: https://ci.syzbot.org/builds/309e9321-2f31-411e-ac93-724f183b5510/config
syz repro: https://ci.syzbot.org/findings/89658ad2-f692-4500-bd4e-ef9d90dc18e5/syz_repro
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz.0.17/5852 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff908c1a40 (keyring_serialise_link_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:1305 [inline]
ffffffff908c1a40 (keyring_serialise_link_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x1d3/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
but task is already holding lock:
ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:-1 [inline]
ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x16a/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
down_write_nested+0x98/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1757
__key_instantiate_and_link+0x9d/0x4d0 security/keys/key.c:451
key_instantiate_and_link+0x331/0x4b0 security/keys/key.c:549
keyring_alloc+0x6f/0xb0 security/keys/keyring.c:541
system_trusted_keyring_init+0x67/0x120 certs/system_keyring.c:231
do_one_initcall+0x250/0x870 init/main.c:1419
do_initcall_level+0x10a/0x1a0 init/main.c:1481
do_initcalls+0x59/0xa0 init/main.c:1497
kernel_init_freeable+0x29d/0x3e0 init/main.c:1732
kernel_init+0x22/0x1d0 init/main.c:1622
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
-> #1 (key_construction_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x197/0x15a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
__key_instantiate_and_link+0x8f/0x4d0 security/keys/key.c:443
key_instantiate_and_link+0x466/0x4b0 security/keys/key.c:549
keyring_alloc+0x6f/0xb0 security/keys/keyring.c:541
look_up_user_keyrings+0x376/0x670 security/keys/process_keys.c:116
do_one_initcall+0x250/0x870 init/main.c:1419
do_initcall_level+0x10a/0x1a0 init/main.c:1481
do_initcalls+0x59/0xa0 init/main.c:1497
kernel_init_freeable+0x29d/0x3e0 init/main.c:1732
kernel_init+0x22/0x1d0 init/main.c:1622
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
-> #0 (keyring_serialise_link_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3209 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3328 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3952 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x164c/0x2de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5288
lock_acquire+0x115/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5942
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x197/0x15a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
__key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:1305 [inline]
key_move+0x1d3/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
keyctl_keyring_move+0xd6/0x110 security/keys/keyctl.c:618
__do_sys_keyctl security/keys/keyctl.c:2023 [inline]
__se_sys_keyctl+0x85a/0xbc0 security/keys/keyctl.c:1885
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x171/0x540 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
keyring_serialise_link_lock --> key_construction_mutex --> &type->lock_class/1
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&type->lock_class/1);
lock(key_construction_mutex);
lock(&type->lock_class/1);
lock(keyring_serialise_link_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
locks held by syz.0.17/5852: 2, on CPU#0:
#0: ffff888104aa1090 (&type->lock_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:-1 [inline]
#0: ffff888104aa1090 (&type->lock_class#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x159/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
#1: ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:-1 [inline]
#1: ffff888104aa1290 (&type->lock_class/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: key_move+0x16a/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5852 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_circular_bug+0x2e2/0x300 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2087
check_noncircular+0x12f/0x150 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2219
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3209 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3328 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3952 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x164c/0x2de0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5288
lock_acquire+0x115/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5942
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:646 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x197/0x15a0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:821
__key_move_lock security/keys/keyring.c:1305 [inline]
key_move+0x1d3/0x7b0 security/keys/keyring.c:1634
keyctl_keyring_move+0xd6/0x110 security/keys/keyctl.c:618
__do_sys_keyctl security/keys/keyctl.c:2023 [inline]
__se_sys_keyctl+0x85a/0xbc0 security/keys/keyctl.c:1885
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x171/0x540 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f417a9a8fd9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f417b7c9028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f417ac25fa0 RCX: 00007f417a9a8fd9
RDX: fffffffffffffffe RSI: 00000000326b97d4 RDI: 000000000000001e
RBP: 00007f417aa37fed R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000326b97d4 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f417ac26038 R14: 00007f417ac25fa0 R15: 00007ffc44b5b118
</TASK>
***
If these findings have caused you to resend the series or submit a
separate fix, please add the following tag to your commit message:
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
syzbot ci engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
The email will later be sent to:
[dhowells@redhat.com enscrpt@pm.me jarkko@kernel.org jmorris@namei.org keyrings@vger.kernel.org linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org paul@paul-moore.com serge@hallyn.com stable@vger.kernel.org]
If the report looks fine to you, reply with:
#syz upstream
If the report is a false positive, reply with
#syz invalid
next reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 6:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-19 6:53 syzbot ci [this message]
2026-11-19 6:58 ` [moderation/CI] Re: keys: serialise instantiation against keyctl_chown_key Aleksandr Nogikh
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