[PATCH v1] perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap

[Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>]

Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only
privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check
in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify
user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing
attack surface.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7776fa40-6c65-2aa6-1322-eb3a01201000@linux.intel.com/

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 856d98c36f56..f50d528af444 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11587,7 +11587,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			goto err_task;
 
 		/*
-		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
-- 
2.24.1