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From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
To: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET
Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2025 10:09:47 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6eb938a8-e6ab-4510-b5c4-839e20c65d80@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aG_Tg6rfexLf3qOl@mail.gmail.com>



On 7/10/25 7:51 AM, Paul Chaignon wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 09, 2025 at 04:57:28PM -0700, Yonghong Song wrote:
>>
>> On 7/9/25 3:26 PM, Paul Chaignon wrote:
>>> Syzbot reported a kernel warning due to a range invariant violation on
>>> the following BPF program.
>>>
>>>     0: call bpf_get_netns_cookie
>>>     1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit>
>>>     2: if r0 & Oxffffffff goto <exit>
>>>
>>> The issue is on the path where we fall through both jumps.
>>>
>>> That path is unreachable at runtime: after insn 1, we know r0 != 0, but
>>> with the sign extension on the jset, we would only fallthrough insn 2
>>> if r0 == 0. Unfortunately, is_branch_taken() isn't currently able to
>>> figure this out, so the verifier walks all branches. The verifier then
>>> refines the register bounds using the second condition and we end
>>> up with inconsistent bounds on this unreachable path:
>>>
>>>     1: if r0 == 0 goto <exit>
>>>       r0: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0xffffffffffffffff)
>>>     2: if r0 & 0xffffffff goto <exit>
>>>       r0 before reg_bounds_sync: u64=[0x1, 0xffffffffffffffff] var_off=(0, 0)
>>>       r0 after reg_bounds_sync:  u64=[0x1, 0] var_off=(0, 0)
>>>
>>> Improving the range refinement for JSET to cover all cases is tricky. We
>>> also don't expect many users to rely on JSET given LLVM doesn't generate
>>> those instructions. So instead of reducing false positives due to JSETs,
>>> Eduard suggested we forget the ranges whenever we're narrowing tnums
>>> after a JSET. This patch implements that approach.
>>>
>>> Reported-by: syzbot+c711ce17dd78e5d4fdcf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>>> Suggested-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
>>> ---
>>>    kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++++
>>>    1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>> index 53007182b46b..e2fcea860755 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>>> @@ -16208,6 +16208,10 @@ static void regs_refine_cond_op(struct bpf_reg_state *reg1, struct bpf_reg_state
>>>    		if (!is_reg_const(reg2, is_jmp32))
>>>    			break;
>>>    		val = reg_const_value(reg2, is_jmp32);
>>> +		/* Forget the ranges before narrowing tnums, to avoid invariant
>>> +		 * violations if we're on a dead branch.
>>> +		 */
>>> +		__mark_reg_unbounded(reg1);
>>>    		if (is_jmp32) {
>>>    			t = tnum_and(tnum_subreg(reg1->var_off), tnum_const(~val));
>>>    			reg1->var_off = tnum_with_subreg(reg1->var_off, t);
>> The CI reports some invariant violation:
>>    https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/16182458904/job/45681940946?pr=9283
> AFAICS, these invariant violations predate this change. They seem to be
> expected and caused by selftests crossing_64_bit_signed_boundary_2 and
> crossing_32_bit_signed_boundary_2 which are both marked as "known
> invariants violation". They look like fairly different violations as
> they are not caused by JSET instructions.

I double checked and that 'REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION' warning is indeed
not related to your patch so your change looks good to me. You can add
my ack like

   Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>

>
> I think it's still worth having the above change for JSET because we
> lose only the ranges and not the tnums, whereas with an invariant
> violation, we lose all info on the register. I'm looking into the two
> other invariant violations to see if there's anything we can improve
> there.

Thanks for looking at this!

>
>> [ 283.030177] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 283.030517] verifier
>> bug: REG INVARIANTS VIOLATION (false_reg2): range bounds violation
>> u64=[0x8000000000000010, 0x800000000000000f] s64=[0x8000000000000010,
>> 0x800000000000000f] u32=[0x10, 0xf] s32=[0x10, 0xf]
>> var_off=(0x8000000000000000, 0x1f)(1)
>> [ 283.032139] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 103 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2689
>> reg_bounds_sanity_check+0x1dd/0x1f0 ... Probably this change triggered some
>> other violations. Please take a look.
>>


      reply	other threads:[~2025-07-10 17:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-09 22:26 [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET Paul Chaignon
2025-07-09 22:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] selftests/bpf: Range analysis test case for JSET Paul Chaignon
2025-07-09 23:09   ` Yonghong Song
2025-07-10 14:38     ` Paul Chaignon
2025-07-09 23:26 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Forget ranges when refining tnum after JSET Eduard Zingerman
2025-07-09 23:57 ` Yonghong Song
2025-07-10 14:51   ` Paul Chaignon
2025-07-10 17:09     ` Yonghong Song [this message]

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