From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [bug report] ceph: decode interval_sets for delegated inos
Date: Tue, 03 Dec 2024 06:07:48 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7bc96fca991bd0f16c3f0feb5e3ab255385f013e.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f0d05d36-742f-456e-a0a1-a3c1c78ff20a@stanley.mountain>
On Tue, 2024-12-03 at 11:25 +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 11:19:25AM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > Hello Jeff Layton,
> >
> > Commit d48464878708 ("ceph: decode interval_sets for delegated inos")
> > from Nov 15, 2019 (linux-next), leads to the following Smatch static
> > checker warning:
> >
> > fs/ceph/mds_client.c:644 ceph_parse_deleg_inos()
> > warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow 'sets * 2 * 8' '0-u32max * 8'
> >
> > fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> > 637 static int ceph_parse_deleg_inos(void **p, void *end,
> > 638 struct ceph_mds_session *s)
> > 639 {
> > 640 u32 sets;
> > 641
> > 642 ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, sets, bad);
> > ^^^^
> > set to user data here.
> >
> > 643 if (sets)
> > --> 644 ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sets * 2 * sizeof(__le64), bad);
> > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > This is safe on 64bit but on 32bit systems it can integer overflow/wrap.
> >
In practice, the MDS is only sending a few sets at a time, so this is
an unlikely overflow. Probably, the right fix is to just clamp "sets"
at some value. Maybe 1K or 1M or so? I'd probably rather the Ceph folks
propose a patch for this since I'm not heavily involved there these
days.
> Smatch has similar warnings in ceph_mdsmap_decode().
>
> fs/ceph/mdsmap.c:228 ceph_mdsmap_decode() warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow 'num_export_targets * 4' '0-u32max * 4'
> fs/ceph/mdsmap.c:280 ceph_mdsmap_decode() warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow '8 * (n + 1)' '8 * s32min-s32max'
> fs/ceph/mdsmap.c:337 ceph_mdsmap_decode() warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow '4 * n' '4 * 0-u32max'
> fs/ceph/mdsmap.c:339 ceph_mdsmap_decode() warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow '4 * n' '4 * 0-u32max'
>
Yeah, the mdsmap decoding definitely has some warts. It'd be good to
fix up some of those too so that they can never be a problem.
--
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-03 14:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-03 8:19 [bug report] ceph: decode interval_sets for delegated inos Dan Carpenter
2024-12-03 8:25 ` Dan Carpenter
2024-12-03 14:07 ` Jeff Layton [this message]
2024-12-03 17:06 ` Alex Elder
2024-12-03 18:29 ` Dan Carpenter
2024-12-04 12:50 ` Alex Markuze
2024-12-04 13:12 ` Alex Markuze
2024-12-04 17:05 ` Dan Carpenter
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