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From: "Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@openbsd.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	jeffxu@chromium.org, keescook@chromium.org, jannh@google.com,
	sroettger@google.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	usama.anjum@collabora.com, Liam.Howlett@oracle.com,
	surenb@google.com, merimus@google.com, rdunlap@infradead.org,
	jeffxu@google.com, jorgelo@chromium.org, groeck@chromium.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, pedro.falcato@gmail.com,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 19:47:46 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <84192.1715737666@cvs.openbsd.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wi04ZCm3vTtkcVnAUdiOpX3a0hBZ-aQWONwCubOJQEdXw@mail.gmail.com>

Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:

Regarding mprotect(), POSIX also says:

    An implementation may permit accesses other than those specified by
    prot; however, no implementation shall permit a write to succeed where
    PROT_WRITE has not been set or shall permit any access where PROT_NONE
    alone has been set.

When sealed memory is encountered in the middle of a range, an error
will be returned (which almost noone looks at). Memory after the sealed
region will not be fixed to follow this rule.

It may retain higher permission.

> Maybe some atomicity rules have always been true for BSD, but they've
> never been true for Linux, and while I don't know how authoritative
> that opengroup thing is, it's what google found.

It is not a BSD thing.  I searched many kernels.  I did not find the
Linux behaviour anywhere else.

> > (Linus, don't be a jerk)
> 
> I'm not the one who makes unsubstantiated statements and uses scare
> tactics to try to make said arguments sound more valid than they are.
> 
> So keep your arguments real, please.


CAN YOU PLEASE SHUT IT WITH THE PERSONAL ATTACKS?  ARE YOU SO INSECURE
THAT YOU NEED TO TAKE A TECHNICAL DISCUSSION AND MAKE IT PERSONAL?


In a new world of immutable / sealed memory, I believe there is a much
bigger problem and I would appreciate if the Linux team would give it
some consideration.

mprotect and munmap (and other calls) can now fail, due to intentional
address space manipulation requested by a process (previously).

The other previous errors have been transient system effects, like ENOMEM.

This EPERM with partial change is not transient.  A 5 line test program
can show memory which is not released, or which memory will retain
incorrect permissions.

Have any of you written test programs?

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-15  1:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-15 16:35 [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal jeffxu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 1/5] mseal: Wire up mseal syscall jeffxu
2024-04-15 18:12   ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-15 18:21     ` Linus Torvalds
2024-04-15 19:06       ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 2/5] mseal: add " jeffxu
2024-04-16 14:59   ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-04-16 15:17     ` Jann Horn
2024-04-16 16:42     ` Theo de Raadt
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 3/5] selftest mm/mseal memory sealing jeffxu
2024-04-15 18:32   ` Muhammad Usama Anjum
2024-04-15 20:27     ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-16  0:34       ` Kees Cook
2024-05-02 11:24   ` Ryan Roberts
2024-05-02 15:18     ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-02 22:39     ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-03  8:30       ` Ryan Roberts
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 4/5] mseal:add documentation jeffxu
2024-04-15 16:35 ` [PATCH v10 5/5] selftest mm/mseal read-only elf memory segment jeffxu
2024-04-16 15:13 ` [PATCH v10 0/5] Introduce mseal Liam R. Howlett
2024-04-16 19:40   ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-18 20:19     ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19  1:22       ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-19 14:57         ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19 15:14           ` Jeff Xu
2024-04-19 16:54             ` Suren Baghdasaryan
2024-04-19 17:59         ` Pedro Falcato
2024-04-20  1:23           ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-14 17:46 ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-14 19:52   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-23 23:32     ` Kees Cook
2024-05-23 23:54       ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-24 15:19         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-14 20:59   ` Jonathan Corbet
2024-05-14 21:28     ` Matthew Wilcox
2024-05-14 22:48       ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-14 23:01         ` Andrew Morton
2024-05-14 23:47           ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15  2:58             ` Willy Tarreau
2024-05-15  3:36               ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  4:14                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  6:14                   ` Willy Tarreau
2024-05-15  0:43         ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  0:57           ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15  1:20             ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  1:47               ` Theo de Raadt [this message]
2024-05-15  2:28                 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-15  2:42                   ` Theo de Raadt
2024-05-15  4:53                     ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-14 21:28   ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-15 17:18     ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-15 22:19       ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-16  0:59         ` Jeff Xu
2024-05-21 16:00           ` Liam R. Howlett
2024-05-21 20:55             ` Jeff Xu

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