All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
	<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <francescolavra.fl@gmail.com>,
	Alexey Makhalov <alexey.makhalov@broadcom.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v16 12/13] x86/tsc: Switch to native sched clock
Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 05:41:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <858qqvwl4w.fsf@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Z4gqlbumOFPF_rxd@google.com>

Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> writes:

>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> index 0864b314c26a..9baffb425386 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
> @@ -663,7 +663,12 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
>  	unsigned int eax_denominator, ebx_numerator, ecx_hz, edx;
>  	unsigned int crystal_khz;
>  
> -	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
> +	/*
> +	 * Ignore the vendor when running as a VM, if the hypervisor provides
> +	 * garbage CPUID information then the vendor is also suspect.
> +	 */
> +	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
> +	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < 0x15)
> @@ -713,10 +718,13 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.
> -	 * Mark TSC reliable so no watchdog on it.
> +	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.  Similarly, in a
> +	 * VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as the
> +	 * watchdog source will be emulated in software.  In both cases, mark
> +	 * the TSC reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
>  	 */
> -	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
> +	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
>  		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);

One more point here is for AMD guests, TSC will not be marked reliable
as per the above change, it will only be effective for CPUs supporting
CPUID 15H/16H. Although, the watchdog should be stopped for AMD guests
as well.

Will it make sense to move this before cpuid_level check ?

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
index e7abcc4d02c3..2769d1598c0d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c
@@ -672,6 +672,14 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * In a VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as
+	 * the watchdog source will be emulated in software. Mark the TSC
+	 * reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
+
 	if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level < CPUID_LEAF_TSC)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -719,13 +727,10 @@ unsigned long native_calibrate_tsc(void)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.  Similarly, in a
-	 * VM, any watchdog is going to be less reliable than the TSC as the
-	 * watchdog source will be emulated in software.  In both cases, mark
-	 * the TSC reliable so that no watchdog runs on it.
+	 * For Atom SoCs TSC is the only reliable clocksource.
+	 * Mark TSC reliable so no watchdog on it.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm == INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC

Regards
Nikunj

  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-28  5:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-06 12:46 [PATCH v16 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 01/13] virt: sev-guest: Remove is_vmpck_empty() helper Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 18:38   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 02/13] virt: sev-guest: Replace GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT with GFP_KERNEL Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 18:40   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 03/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 04/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 05/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 10:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 11:43     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-07 12:37       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 18:53         ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-07 19:18           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  7:47             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08  8:05               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  8:37                 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08  8:43                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-07 19:46   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-07 19:53     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 06/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 20:09   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 07/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 08/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP " Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 09/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Mark the TSC in a secure TSC guest as reliable tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 10/13] x86/tsc: Switch Secure TSC guests away from kvm-clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 15:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 10:45     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/tsc: Init the TSC for Secure TSC guests tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 11/13] x86/tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating for guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 17:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 12/13] x86/tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-07 19:37   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  5:20     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08  8:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08  8:34         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 10:20           ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-08 14:00             ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:34               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:02                 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 19:53                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-09  6:32                   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-15 21:37                     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-16 16:25                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-16 16:56                         ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-17 20:28                           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 20:59                             ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-21 11:32                               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-21  3:59                       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-28  5:41                       ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2025-01-06 12:46 ` [PATCH v16 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-09  9:43   ` [tip: x86/sev] x86/sev: Add the " tip-bot2 for Nikunj A Dadhania

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=858qqvwl4w.fsf@amd.com \
    --to=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=alexey.makhalov@broadcom.com \
    --cc=boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=francescolavra.fl@gmail.com \
    --cc=jgross@suse.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.