From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan@pereq.eu>
Cc: "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
"Fuad Tabba" <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>,
"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
"Steffen Eiden" <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
"Suzuki K Poulose" <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
"Zenghui Yu" <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"Jintack Lim" <jintack.lim@linaro.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Karthik Bhargavan" <karthik@pereq.eu>,
"Clément Blaudeau" <clement@cryspen.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Fix AT emulation for TCR2_EL1
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:01:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86ik1w22an.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <eec50693a12e1ba34d60458ae8fe605ac198a79c.1794808373.git.dan@pereq.eu>
On Mon, 16 Nov 2026 06:00:52 +0000,
Dan Carpenter <dan@pereq.eu> wrote:
>
> Arm provides an AT instruction that translates a virtual address the way
> the MMU would and returns the result. There is a bug in the way this
> instruction is emulated for nested virtualization because of how TCR2_EL1
> is handled. The bug is fairly minor.
>
> The TCR2_EL1 register has bits which turn on permission indirection
> (PIE) and permission overlays (POE). When these bits are set, the AT
> instruction reads the permissions stored in PIR_EL1 and POR_EL1. If
> you have the right features and permissions then in the return value from
> the AT instruction we set one bit to either 1 or 0 depending on whether
> the access would be allowed or whether it would fault.
>
> However, the bug is that just because the host has TCR2 enabled, it
> doesn't mean the VM has it. KVM doesn't load these registers for a VM
> which doesn't have the features, instead the AT runs with the host's
> HCRX_EL2, which has TCR2En set. So the AT uses the TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1 and
> POR_EL1 values another VM left on the CPU, or possibly the VMM's POR_EL0.
> Likewise, for a VM which has TCR2 but not PIE or POE, the L2's TCR2_EL1
> is loaded unmasked.
>
> The impact of this bug is that we leak a single bit of data to the L1,
> but in real life it's hard to imagine how it is useful to an attacker.
>
> Fix this by writing zero to TCR2_EL1 when the VM doesn't have TCR2, and
> by clearing the PIE and POE bits when the VM doesn't have those
> features. Also it should be effective_tcr2(vcpu, TR_EL10) to read the
> TCR2 for the L1 instead of vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1).
>
> Fixes: 477e89cabb14 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Add basic emulation of AT S1E{0,1}{R,W}")
> Fixes: 23e7a34c8397 ("KVM: arm64: Add AT fast-path support for S1PIE")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan@pereq.eu>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kvm/at.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> index 30d8f062b2c2..06765881a4c8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
> @@ -1438,7 +1438,13 @@ static u64 __kvm_at_s1e01_fast(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
> write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR_EL1), SYS_TCR);
> write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, MAIR_EL1), SYS_MAIR);
> if (kvm_has_tcr2(vcpu->kvm)) {
> - write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1), SYS_TCR2);
> + u64 tcr2 = effective_tcr2(vcpu, TR_EL10);
> +
> + if (!kvm_has_s1pie(vcpu->kvm))
> + tcr2 &= ~TCR2_EL1_PIE;
> + if (!kvm_has_s1poe(vcpu->kvm))
> + tcr2 &= ~(TCR2_EL1_POE | TCR2_EL1_E0POE);
> + write_sysreg_el1(tcr2, SYS_TCR2);
The sanitising should really be moved into the effective_tcr2()
helper, as this is its purpose. Something like the below, which is
obviously untested... Ultimately, TCR2_EL1 should be moved to the
automatic sanitisation scheme to inherit the expected RES0 behaviours.
> if (kvm_has_s1pie(vcpu->kvm)) {
> write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, PIR_EL1), SYS_PIR);
> write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, PIRE0_EL1), SYS_PIRE0);
> @@ -1452,6 +1458,9 @@ static u64 __kvm_at_s1e01_fast(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
> __load_stage2(mmu);
>
> skip_mmu_switch:
> + if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2) && !kvm_has_tcr2(vcpu->kvm))
> + write_sysreg_el1(0, SYS_TCR2);
> +
> /* Temporarily switch back to guest context */
> write_sysreg_hcr(vcpu->arch.hcr_el2);
> isb();
> @@ -1554,6 +1563,9 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
> if (!vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu))
> val |= HCR_EL2_NV | HCR_EL2_NV1;
>
> + if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2) && !kvm_has_tcr2(vcpu->kvm))
> + write_sysreg_el1(0, SYS_TCR2);
> +
> write_sysreg_hcr(val);
> isb();
>
This one needs fixing, as sashiko reported, but the reason why the
proposed fix works at all is pretty fragile:
- the reset value is 0
- we enforce RES0 behaviours on all interesting fields
- TCR2_ELx are trapped and result in an UNDEF
So this deserves a comment, along the lines of what I have written in
the hack below.
Thanks,
M.
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
index 30d8f062b2c29..1ff452277f27e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/at.c
@@ -91,11 +91,16 @@ static enum trans_regime compute_translation_regime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 o
static u64 effective_tcr2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum trans_regime regime)
{
if (regime == TR_EL10) {
+ u64 val;
+
if (vcpu_has_nv(vcpu) &&
!(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, HCRX_EL2) & HCRX_EL2_TCR2En))
return 0;
- return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1);
+ val = vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL1);
+ val &= ~(kvm_has_s1poe(vcpu->kvm) ? (TCR2_EL1_POE | TCR2_EL1_E0POE) : 0);
+ val &= ~(kvm_has_s1pie(vcpu->kvm) ? TCR2_EL1_PIE : 0);
+ return val;
}
return vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL2);
@@ -1544,7 +1549,7 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
* switching context behind everybody's back, disable interrupts...
*/
scoped_guard(write_lock_irqsave, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) {
- u64 val, hcr;
+ u64 val, hcr, tcr2;
bool fail;
val = hcr = read_sysreg(hcr_el2);
@@ -1554,6 +1559,16 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
if (!vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu))
val |= HCR_EL2_NV | HCR_EL2_NV1;
+ if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2)) {
+ tcr2 = read_sysreg_el1(SYS_TCR2);
+ /*
+ * This relies on the reset value of TCR2_EL2
+ * being 0, and not being modified when
+ * FEAT_TCR2 is not exposed to the guest
+ */
+ write_sysreg_el1(vcpu_read_sys_reg(vcpu, TCR2_EL2), SYS_TCR2);
+ }
+
write_sysreg_hcr(val);
isb();
@@ -1577,6 +1592,9 @@ int __kvm_at_s1e2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 op, u64 vaddr)
if (!fail)
par = read_sysreg_par();
+ if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_TCR2))
+ write_sysreg_el1(tcr2, SYS_TCR2);
+
write_sysreg_hcr(hcr);
isb();
}
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 16:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-16 6:00 [PATCH 0/2] KVM: arm64: nv: fix a couple bugs in AT emulation Dan Carpenter
2026-11-16 6:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Update the shadow MMU's VMID for " Dan Carpenter
2026-11-16 6:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Fix AT emulation for TCR2_EL1 Dan Carpenter
2026-11-16 6:27 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-16 9:22 ` Dan Carpenter
2026-11-16 16:01 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
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