From: Mykyta Yatsenko <mykyta.yatsenko5@gmail.com>
To: Hiker Cl <clhiker365@gmail.com>, bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: NULL pointer dereference in map_kptr_match_type when storing scalar values into kptr slots
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2026 12:58:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87340v9kwz.fsf@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGM=xGABGeeGVU7hy_mRr_rp377dBzVVAOpkLnuYKb8XyEs7Hg@mail.gmail.com>
Hiker Cl <clhiker365@gmail.com> writes:
> Hi BPF maintainers,
>
> I'm reporting a bug I encountered in the BPF subsystem on Linux kernel
> version 7.0.0-g1f5ffc672165.
>
> ### Summary
> A NULL pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the eBPF
> verifier. A local user can trigger this by loading a BPF program that
> attempts to store a scalar value (non-pointer) into a map slot
> designated as a kptr (kernel pointer). This leads to an immediate
> kernel crash (DoS).
> ### Environment
> - Kernel version: 7.0.0-rc6 (Commit: 71b500afd2f7 from bpf-next tree),
> 7.0.0-g1f5ffc672165 (Commit: 1f5ffc672165 from linux tree)
> - Architecture: x86_64
> - Config: BPF_SYSCALL=y, DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y
>
> ### Steps to Reproduce (poc.c)
> #include "vmlinux.h"
> #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
> /* BTF type tags for kptrs */
> #ifndef __kptr_untrusted
> #define __kptr_untrusted __attribute__((btf_type_tag("kptr_untrusted")))
> #endif
> struct map_value {
> struct task_struct __kptr_untrusted *ptr;
> };
> struct {
> __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_HASH);
> __uint(max_entries, 1);
> __type(key, int);
> __type(value, struct map_value);
> } crashing_map SEC(".maps");
> SEC("kprobe/htab_map_get_next_key")
> int trigger_crash(struct pt_regs *ctx)
> {
> int key = 0;
> u64 *val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&crashing_map, &key);
> if (val) {
> /*
> * Trigger: Store a scalar (non-pointer) into a slot
> * designated as a kptr. The verifier's map_kptr_match_type
> * fails to handle the NULL reg->btf for scalars.
> */
> *val = 0xdeadbeef;
> }
> return 0;
> }
> char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
>
> ### Kernel Log Extract
> [ 91.277247][ T7627] Oops: general protection fault, probably for
> non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000I
> [ 91.279715][ T7627] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range
> [0x00000000000000e8-0x00000000000000ef]
> [ 91.280906][ T7627] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7627 Comm: bpftool Not
> tainted 7.0.0-g1f5ffc672165 #5 PREEMPT(full)
> [ 91.282421][ T7627] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX,
> 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
> [ 91.283556][ T7627] RIP: 0010:btf_is_kernel+0x2a/0x50
> ...
>
> ### Actual Results
> The kernel crashes during the verification phase. The verifier calls
> `map_kptr_match_type`, which subsequently calls
> `btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)`. Since the source register is a scalar,
> `reg->btf` is NULL, leading to a NULL pointer dereference.
>
> Detailed info including reproducible BPF program and kernel logs have
> been filed on Bugzilla:
>
> https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=221372
>
> Please let me know if you need more information or if I can help test
> a patch.
Thanks for reporting the issue, I can reproduce it.
Looks like a simple fix resolves is:
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 9882475ee9da..91aa51a19c91 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -4544,6 +4544,9 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
int perm_flags;
const char *reg_name = "";
+ if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID)
+ goto bad_type;
+
if (btf_is_kernel(reg->btf)) {
perm_flags = PTR_MAYBE_NULL | PTR_TRUSTED | MEM_RCU;
@@ -4556,7 +4559,7 @@ static int map_kptr_match_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
perm_flags |= MEM_PERCPU;
}
- if (base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags))
+ if (type_flag(reg->type) & ~perm_flags)
goto bad_type;
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-16 11:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-16 2:16 NULL pointer dereference in map_kptr_match_type when storing scalar values into kptr slots Hiker Cl
2026-04-16 11:58 ` Mykyta Yatsenko [this message]
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