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From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Cc: pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, jpoimboe@kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de,
	leit@fb.com, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2023 10:21:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87352shc98.fsf@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230615164417.3588162-1-leitao@debian.org> (Breno Leitao's message of "Thu, 15 Jun 2023 09:44:11 -0700")

Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> writes:

> There is no way to compile a kernel today with some of the speculative
> mitigations disabled. Even if the kernel has
> CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n, some Intel mitigations, such as MDS, TAA,
> MMIO are still enabled and can only be disabled using a kernel parameter.
>
> This patchset creates a way to choose what to enable or disable, and,
> get the mitigations disable if CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is not
> set, as the rest of other mitigations.
>
> Also, we want to print a warning message letting users know that these
> mitigations are disabled.
>
> This is a follow up to this discussion: https://lkml.org/lkml/2023/6/12/798
>

Isn't this all roughly equivalent to CONFIG_CMDLINE="mitigations=..." ?

-Andi

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-06-15 17:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-15 16:44 [PATCH 0/2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 16:44 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86/bugs: Create an option to disable MDS Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 22:13   ` Pawan Gupta
2023-06-16 11:47     ` Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 16:44 ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/bugs: Create an option to disable TAA Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 16:44 ` [PATCH 3/3] x86/bugs: Create an option to disable MMIO vulnerability Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 16:44 ` [PATCH 0/2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 16:44 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/speculation: Disable mitigations if CONFIG says so Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 16:44 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/speculation: Print error when mitigations are disabled Breno Leitao
2023-06-15 17:21 ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2023-06-16  8:39   ` [PATCH 0/2] x86/bugs: Break down mitigations configurations Breno Leitao

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