From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Authentication-Results: ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.vnet.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=stewart@linux.vnet.ibm.com; receiver=) Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3ygmdF2NmszDrFt for ; Tue, 21 Nov 2017 11:27:44 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.21/8.16.0.21) with SMTP id vAL0O9Wi061307 for ; Mon, 20 Nov 2017 19:27:42 -0500 Received: from e35.co.us.ibm.com (e35.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.153]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2ec7bw59et-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 20 Nov 2017 19:27:41 -0500 Received: from localhost by e35.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Mon, 20 Nov 2017 17:27:40 -0700 Received: from b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (9.17.130.19) by e35.co.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.135) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; Mon, 20 Nov 2017 17:27:38 -0700 Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.233]) by b03cxnp08027.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id vAL0Rbjn6029702; Mon, 20 Nov 2017 17:27:37 -0700 Received: from b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9B4ED136044; Mon, 20 Nov 2017 17:27:37 -0700 (MST) Received: from birb.localdomain (unknown [9.102.46.226]) by b03ledav002.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with SMTP id BBE78136043; Mon, 20 Nov 2017 17:27:36 -0700 (MST) Received: by birb.localdomain (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 0E6574F0CAA; Tue, 21 Nov 2017 11:27:33 +1100 (AEDT) From: Stewart Smith To: "Tanous\, Ed" , Brad Bishop , OpenBMC Maillist Subject: RE: OpenBMC community telecon - 11/20 Agenda In-Reply-To: <7E9441B1E5EFFD4681F54958E82169932F4A58B2@ORSMSX114.amr.corp.intel.com> References: <785099C4-5D19-4341-9F40-3B6A3404EEC8@fuzziesquirrel.com> <7E9441B1E5EFFD4681F54958E82169932F4A58B2@ORSMSX114.amr.corp.intel.com> Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 11:27:33 +1100 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 17112100-0012-0000-0000-000015553232 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008101; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000240; SDB=6.00948838; UDB=6.00479146; IPR=6.00729118; BA=6.00005702; NDR=6.00000001; ZLA=6.00000005; ZF=6.00000009; ZB=6.00000000; ZP=6.00000000; ZH=6.00000000; ZU=6.00000002; MB=3.00018113; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2017-11-21 00:27:39 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 17112100-0013-0000-0000-0000505A5A9E Message-Id: <873758zdai.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2017-11-20_12:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=1 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1711210004 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.24 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 00:27:45 -0000 "Tanous, Ed" writes: > Secure coding guidelines: > What secure coding guidelines are other groups/individuals using? I'd like to have an open discussion about how to move toward more secure coding guidelines with the minimum possible interruption while alienating the minimum number of people. Some subtopics: > 1. Can anything be enforced at the master branch? > 2. Can anything be enforced by policy? (example: reference components must be secure) > 3. Does anyone have experience with automating secure coding > guidelines? A minimal starting point would be to run every code repository through Coverity Scan. Setting this up with travs-ci isn't too hard (we do it for parts of host firmware today). Efforts to limit the damage could also be good, like strict SELinux policy. After all, much of the current design would work quite well for that. -- Stewart Smith OPAL Architect, IBM.