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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Li Huafei <lihuafei1@huawei.com>, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com
Cc: acme@kernel.org, namhyung@kernel.org, mark.rutland@arm.com,
	alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, jolsa@kernel.org,
	irogers@google.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
	kan.liang@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	lihuafei1@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] perf/x86/intel: Restrict period on Haswell
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 21:20:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <875xsl5pwv.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240729223328.327835-1-lihuafei1@huawei.com>

On Tue, Jul 30 2024 at 06:33, Li Huafei wrote:
> On my Haswell machine, running the ltp test cve-2015-3290 concurrently
> reports the following warnings:
>
>   perfevents: irq loop stuck!
>   WARNING: CPU: 31 PID: 32438 at arch/x86/events/intel/core.c:3174 intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x285/0x370
>   CPU: 31 UID: 0 PID: 32438 Comm: cve-2015-3290 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S      W          6.11.0-rc1+ #3
>   ...
>   Call Trace:
>    <NMI>
>    ? __warn+0xa4/0x220
>    ? intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x285/0x370
>    ? __report_bug+0x123/0x130
>    ? intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x285/0x370
>    ? __report_bug+0x123/0x130
>    ? intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x285/0x370
>    ? report_bug+0x3e/0xa0
>    ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
>    ? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50
>    ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
>    ? irq_work_claim+0x1e/0x40
>    ? intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x285/0x370
>    perf_event_nmi_handler+0x3d/0x60
>    nmi_handle+0x104/0x330
>    ? ___ratelimit+0xe4/0x1b0
>    default_do_nmi+0x40/0x100
>    exc_nmi+0x104/0x180
>    end_repeat_nmi+0xf/0x53
>    ...
>    ? intel_pmu_lbr_enable_all+0x2a/0x90
>    ? __intel_pmu_enable_all.constprop.0+0x16d/0x1b0
>    ? __intel_pmu_enable_all.constprop.0+0x16d/0x1b0
>    perf_ctx_enable+0x8e/0xc0
>    __perf_install_in_context+0x146/0x3e0
>    ? __pfx___perf_install_in_context+0x10/0x10
>    remote_function+0x7c/0xa0
>    ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10
>    generic_exec_single+0xf8/0x150
>    smp_call_function_single+0x1dc/0x230
>    ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10
>    ? __pfx_smp_call_function_single+0x10/0x10
>    ? __pfx_remote_function+0x10/0x10
>    ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
>    ? exclusive_event_installable+0x4f/0x140
>    perf_install_in_context+0x197/0x330
>    ? __pfx_perf_install_in_context+0x10/0x10
>    ? __pfx___perf_install_in_context+0x10/0x10
>    __do_sys_perf_event_open+0xb80/0x1100
>    ? __pfx___do_sys_perf_event_open+0x10/0x10
>    ? __pfx___lock_release+0x10/0x10
>    ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x135/0x200
>    ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xee/0x100
>    ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0x92/0x100
>    do_syscall_64+0x70/0x180
>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
>    ...

Please trim the backtrace to something useful:

https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html#backtraces

> My machine has 32 physical cores, each with two logical cores. During
> testing, it executes the CVE-2015-3290 test case 100 times concurrently.
>
> This warning was already present in [1] and a patch was given there to
> limit period to 128 on Haswell, but that patch was not merged into the
> mainline.  In [2] the period on Nehalem was limited to 32. I tested 16
> and 32 period on my machine and found that the problem could be
> reproduced with a limit of 16, but the problem did not reproduce when
> set to 32. It looks like we can limit the cycles to 32 on Haswell as
> well.

It looks like? Either it works or not.

>  
> +static void hsw_limit_period(struct perf_event *event, s64 *left)
> +{
> +	*left = max(*left, 32LL);
> +}

And why do we need a copy of nhm_limit_period() ?

Thanks,

        tglx

  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-31 19:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-29 22:33 [PATCH] perf/x86/intel: Restrict period on Haswell Li Huafei
2024-07-31 19:20 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2024-08-13 13:13   ` Li Huafei
2024-08-14 14:43     ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-14 14:52     ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-14 18:15       ` Liang, Kan
2024-08-14 19:01         ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-14 19:37           ` Liang, Kan
2024-08-14 22:47             ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-15 15:39               ` Liang, Kan
2024-08-15 18:26                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-15 20:15                   ` Liang, Kan
2024-08-15 23:43                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-16 19:27                       ` Liang, Kan
2024-08-17 12:22                         ` Liang, Kan
2024-08-17 12:23                         ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-15 19:01                 ` Vince Weaver

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