From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama
Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2012 20:31:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87627ye7vh.fsf@xmission.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACLa4ptpGJ7YDTqmOvtHq_Ts9f72SBV6Q_HDDw1OebhxVOzU9w@mail.gmail.com> (Eric Paris's message of "Fri, 31 Aug 2012 20:03:46 -0700")
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> writes:
> On Fri, Aug 31, 2012 at 4:59 PM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>
>> From a overal kernel maintenance and use perspective the unconditional
>> enablement is a pain.
>>
>> We long ago established the principle that compiling additional code
>> into the kernel should not change the semenatics of the kernel.
>>
>> So this code needs to come with a command line or sysctl on/off switch
>> not an unconditional enable.
>
> Your argument makes zero sense. If I decide to build new code, that
> new code can do something.
Sure but it should not change the existing behavior without being
configured to.
This comes out of the practice that kernels that need to support a
wide variety of use cases enable everything by default.
Having to vet kernel options for will this make my kernel do strange
things if this option is enabled, massively increase the burden on
people building and supporting kernels.
> It happens all the time. If you don't like Yama, don't build Yama.
> If you don't like the only thing that Yama does (it only implements
> one protection), disable that protection from sysctl. I don't get it.
Having taken the time now to vet Yama ugh. Having Yama enabled if
simply compiled in breaks using gdb to attach to a process runing
in another window.
Talk about something you don't want to surprise someone with.
It is very much not ok to have that be enabled by default just
because it happens to be compiled in.
Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-09-01 3:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-08-31 21:31 [PATCH] security: unconditionally call Yama Kees Cook
2012-08-31 21:39 ` Alan Cox
2012-08-31 22:49 ` Eric Paris
2012-08-31 23:59 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-01 3:03 ` Eric Paris
2012-09-01 3:31 ` Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2012-09-01 3:42 ` Kees Cook
2012-09-01 4:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2012-09-02 7:37 ` Jiri Kosina
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