From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
To: Jaeyoung Chung <jjy600901@snu.ac.kr>
Cc: perex@perex.cz, tiwai@suse.com, linux-sound@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
byoungyoung@snu.ac.kr, eulgyukim@snu.ac.kr
Subject: Re: [BUG] KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ALSA OSS read/poll race
Date: Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:26:50 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87a4ut3dfp.wl-tiwai@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260423145330.210035-1-jjy600901@snu.ac.kr>
On Thu, 23 Apr 2026 16:53:30 +0200,
Jaeyoung Chung wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
> We found a KASAN slab-use-after-free in the ALSA OSS-compatibility
> layer (sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c) on Linux v6.19.13. A concurrent
> read() and pselect() on an OSS audio device (/dev/dsp) corrupts the
> packed bit-flags in struct snd_pcm_oss_runtime and ends up freeing a
> buffer while another thread is still writing into it.
>
> # Summary
>
> struct snd_pcm_oss_runtime packs four flags into one storage word:
>
> /* include/sound/pcm_oss.h */
> unsigned params: 1, /* format/parameter change */
> prepare: 1, /* need to prepare the operation */
> trigger: 1, /* trigger flag */
> sync_trigger: 1; /* sync trigger flag */
>
> Every writer of these flags holds runtime->oss.params_lock EXCEPT
> snd_pcm_oss_poll(), which clears runtime->oss.trigger unlocked. The
> resulting byte-level RMW race lets poll()'s stale store clobber the
> params=0 store done by snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked(), so
> runtime->oss.params stays 1. The next snd_pcm_oss_make_ready() then
> re-enters change_params_locked() and runs snd_pcm_oss_plugin_clear()
> while a concurrent snd_pcm_oss_read3() is mid-transfer, freeing the
> plugin chain and buffer that __snd_pcm_lib_xfer() is copying into.
>
> # Environment
>
> - Kernel: Linux v6.19.13
> - Arch: x86_64
> - Relevant config:
> CONFIG_SOUND=y
> CONFIG_SND=y
> CONFIG_SND_PCM=y
> CONFIG_SND_OSSEMUL=y
> CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS=y
> CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS_PLUGINS=y
> CONFIG_SND_ALOOP=y
> CONFIG_KASAN=y
> - Device: /dev/dsp backed by snd-aloop (ALSA loopback).
> This is the only card I verified the crash on; with
> CONFIG_SND_ALOOP=y and no other sound card, /proc/asound/cards
> reports:
> 0 [Loopback ]: Loopback - Loopback
> Loopback 1
> Whether other OSS-capable cards are affected has not been
> tested.
>
> # Thread interleaving
>
> Shared byte B = params | prepare | trigger | sync_trigger.
> Initial: params=1, trigger=1 => B = 0b0101 = 0x05.
>
> CPU 0: read() thread CPU 1: pselect() thread
> ==================== =======================
> snd_pcm_oss_read -> read1
> mutex_lock(params_lock)
> snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked
> snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked
> plugin->buf = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> snd_pcm_oss_poll
> // runtime->oss.trigger = 0;
> reg = READ(B) ; reg = 0x05
> /* mdelay(100) */
> // runtime->oss.params = 0;
> RMW B: params = 0 ; B := 0x04
> // runtime->oss.prepare = 1;
> RMW B: prepare = 1 ; B := 0x06
> snd_pcm_oss_read2
> snd_pcm_plug_read_transfer
> snd_pcm_oss_read3
> mutex_unlock(params_lock)
> /* mdelay(1000) */
> reg &= ~0x4 ; reg = 0x01
> WRITE(B, reg) ; B := 0x01
> /* clobbers A's (params=0,
> prepare=1): params is 1 again */
> snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(.., PCM_ENABLE_INPUT)
> snd_pcm_oss_make_ready(csubstream)
> /* oss.params == 1 (stale) */
> snd_pcm_oss_change_params
> mutex_lock(params_lock)
> change_params_locked:
> snd_pcm_oss_plugin_clear
> kvfree(plugin->buf);
> mutex_unlock(params_lock)
> __snd_pcm_lib_xfer
> default_read_copy
> copy_to_iter
> memcpy(<freed buffer>, ...) <-- USE-AFTER-FREE (write)
>
> # Included items
>
> 1. C reproducer
> 2. Kernel delay patch (for deterministic triggering only; not the fix)
> 3. KASAN crash log
> 4. Proposed fix
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 1. C reproducer
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Build: gcc -static -pthread -o race race.c
> Run: ./race # uses /dev/dsp by default
>
> // -- begin race.c --
> // gcc -static -o race race.c -lpthread
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> #include <err.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <pthread.h>
> #include <sched.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <string.h>
> #include <sys/select.h>
> #include <time.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
>
> #define SYSCHK(x) \
> ({ \
> typeof(x) __res = (x); \
> if (__res == (typeof(x))-1) \
> err(1, "SYSCHK(" #x ")"); \
> __res; \
> })
>
> #define DSP_PATH "/dev/dsp"
> int dsp_fd, ready = 0;
>
> void pin_to_cpu(int cpu) {
> cpu_set_t cset;
> CPU_ZERO(&cset);
> CPU_SET(cpu, &cset);
> SYSCHK(sched_setaffinity(0, sizeof(cset), &cset));
> }
>
> static void *poll_thread(void *arg) {
> fd_set rfds;
> struct timespec timeout = {.tv_sec = 30};
>
> pin_to_cpu(0);
> FD_ZERO(&rfds);
> FD_SET(dsp_fd, &rfds);
> printf("[begin] pselect\n");
> while (!ready) {
> sched_yield();
> }
> int ret = pselect(dsp_fd + 1, &rfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout, NULL);
> printf("[end] pselect = %d\n", ret);
>
> return NULL;
> }
>
> static void *read_thread(void *arg) {
> unsigned char buf[1] = {0};
>
> pin_to_cpu(1);
> printf("[begin] read\n");
> ready = 1;
> sched_yield();
> ssize_t ret = read(dsp_fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
> printf("[end] read = %zd\n", ret);
>
> return NULL;
> }
>
> int main(int argc, char **argv) {
> const char *path = (argc > 1) ? argv[1] : DSP_PATH;
> pthread_t t1, t2;
>
> pin_to_cpu(0);
>
> dsp_fd = SYSCHK(open(path, O_RDONLY));
>
> pthread_create(&t1, NULL, poll_thread, NULL);
> pthread_create(&t2, NULL, read_thread, NULL);
>
> pthread_join(t1, NULL);
> pthread_join(t2, NULL);
>
> close(dsp_fd);
> return 0;
> }
> // -- end race.c --
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 2. Kernel delay patch (to make the race deterministic)
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> This is NOT the fix. It only widens two windows:
> (a) In snd_pcm_oss_poll(), split "trigger = 0" into an explicit
> READ / mdelay(100) / MODIFY / WRITE on the underlying byte, to
> emulate and stretch the compiler-emitted byte RMW.
> (b) In snd_pcm_oss_read3(), insert mdelay(1000) between
> mutex_unlock() and __snd_pcm_lib_xfer() so the plugin chain is
> still in use while the racing free happens.
>
> diff --git a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
> index 3bc94d34b..f7a176444 100644
> --- a/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
> +++ b/sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> #include <linux/soundcard.h>
> #include <sound/initval.h>
> #include <sound/mixer_oss.h>
> +#include <linux/delay.h>
>
> #define OSS_ALSAEMULVER _SIOR ('M', 249, int)
>
> @@ -1281,6 +1282,8 @@ snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_oss_read3(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream, char *p
> if (ret < 0)
> break;
> mutex_unlock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
> + pr_info("mdelay before __snd_pcm_lib_xfer\n");
> + mdelay(1000);
> ret = __snd_pcm_lib_xfer(substream, (void *)ptr, true,
> frames, in_kernel);
> mutex_lock(&runtime->oss.params_lock);
> @@ -2862,7 +2865,13 @@ static __poll_t snd_pcm_oss_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
> struct snd_pcm_oss_file ofile;
> memset(&ofile, 0, sizeof(ofile));
> ofile.streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE] = pcm_oss_file->streams[SNDRV_PCM_STREAM_CAPTURE];
> - runtime->oss.trigger = 0;
> + // runtime->oss.trigger = 0;
> + u8 *p = (u8 *)&runtime->oss;
> + u8 v = READ_ONCE(*p);
> + pr_info("delay between bitfield RMW\n");
> + mdelay(100);
> + v &= ~0x4;
> + WRITE_ONCE(*p, v);
> snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger(&ofile, PCM_ENABLE_INPUT);
> }
> }
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 3. KASAN crash log
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in memcpy_to_iter lib/iov_iter.c:77 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iterate_kvec include/linux/iov_iter.h:86 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:308 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:330 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _copy_to_iter+0xa10/0x1480 lib/iov_iter.c:197
> Write of size 8192 at addr ff11000013ff4000 by task race/350
> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 350 Comm: race Not tainted 6.19.13-dirty #14 NONE
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> dump_stack_lvl+0x8f/0xc0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
> print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
> print_report+0xd0/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:482
> kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595
> check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
> kasan_check_range+0x2b0/0x2c0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200
> __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106
> memcpy_to_iter lib/iov_iter.c:77 [inline]
> iterate_kvec include/linux/iov_iter.h:86 [inline]
> iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:308 [inline]
> iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:330 [inline]
> _copy_to_iter+0xa10/0x1480 lib/iov_iter.c:197
> copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:220 [inline]
> default_read_copy+0x11f/0x1b0 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:2092
> do_transfer sound/core/pcm_lib.c:-1 [inline]
> interleaved_copy+0x191/0x200 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:2141
> __snd_pcm_lib_xfer+0x1165/0x1890 sound/core/pcm_lib.c:2380
> snd_pcm_oss_read3+0x2ca/0x410 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1286
> snd_pcm_plug_read_transfer+0x259/0x2f0 sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c:663
> snd_pcm_oss_read2+0x1c7/0x3b0 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1487
> snd_pcm_oss_read1 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1525 [inline]
> snd_pcm_oss_read+0x3d0/0x7b0 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:2778
> vfs_read+0x15b/0x8a0 fs/read_write.c:570
> ksys_read+0xca/0x190 fs/read_write.c:715
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> RIP: 0033:0x7bdf3b94d2dc
> Code: ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24 10 89 7c 24 08 e8 59 d5 f8 ff 48 8b 54 24 18 48 8b 74 248
> RSP: 002b:00007bdf3b04fe70 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007bdf3b0506c0 RCX: 00007bdf3b94d2dc
> RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00007bdf3b04fec7 RDI: 0000000000000003
> RBP: 00007bdf3b04fed0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffe6810a877
> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: ffffffffffffff80
> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe6810a780 R15: 00007bdf3a850000
> </TASK>
> Allocated by task 350:
> kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
> kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
> poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
> __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:415
> kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
> __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5754 [inline]
> __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3a3/0x710 mm/slub.c:7261
> snd_pcm_plugin_alloc+0x183/0x700 sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c:74
> snd_pcm_plug_alloc+0x14a/0x270 sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c:133
> snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked+0x2190/0x3440 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1043
> snd_pcm_oss_make_ready_locked sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1191 [inline]
> snd_pcm_oss_read1 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1520 [inline]
> snd_pcm_oss_read+0x247/0x7b0 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:2778
> vfs_read+0x15b/0x8a0 fs/read_write.c:570
> ksys_read+0xca/0x190 fs/read_write.c:715
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> Freed by task 349:
> kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
> kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
> kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
> poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline]
> __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:285
> kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
> slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2580 [inline]
> slab_free mm/slub.c:6791 [inline]
> kfree+0x169/0x3f0 mm/slub.c:7003
> snd_pcm_plugin_free+0xb2/0xd0 sound/core/oss/pcm_plugin.c:198
> snd_pcm_oss_plugin_clear sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:541 [inline]
> snd_pcm_oss_change_params_locked+0x1bd5/0x3440 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:974
> snd_pcm_oss_change_params sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1109 [inline]
> snd_pcm_oss_make_ready+0xdf/0x270 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:1168
> snd_pcm_oss_set_trigger+0x87/0x6c0 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:2083
> snd_pcm_oss_poll+0x739/0x870 sound/core/oss/pcm_oss.c:2873
> vfs_poll include/linux/poll.h:82 [inline]
> select_poll_one fs/select.c:480 [inline]
> do_select+0xbdb/0x11c0 fs/select.c:536
> core_sys_select+0x4dc/0x720 fs/select.c:677
> do_pselect fs/select.c:759 [inline]
> __do_sys_pselect6 fs/select.c:798 [inline]
> __se_sys_pselect6+0x18d/0x1f0 fs/select.c:789
> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
> do_syscall_64+0x6e/0x6a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ff11000013ff4000
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
> The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> freed 8192-byte region [ff11000013ff4000, ff11000013ff6000)
> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x13ff0
> head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
> flags: 0x100000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)
> page_type: f5(slab)
> raw: 0100000000000040 ff1100000ac38280 ffd40000004ffa00 0000000000000006
> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080020002 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
> head: 0100000000000040 ff1100000ac38280 ffd40000004ffa00 0000000000000006
> head: 0000000000000000 0000000080020002 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
> head: 0100000000000003 ffd40000004ffc01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
> head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ff11000013ff3f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> ff11000013ff3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >ff11000013ff4000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ^
> ff11000013ff4080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ff11000013ff4100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
> ==================================================================
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 4. Proposed fix
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Split the four packed bit-flags into independent bytes so they no
> longer share a storage word. Writes to one flag can then no longer
> corrupt the others regardless of locking.
>
> Another possible fix direction may be to take `runtime->oss.params_lock`
> in the poll path before touching `runtime->oss.trigger`,
> since `snd_pcm_oss_poll()` appears to be the only writer
> of these flags that currently does not use that mutex.
>
> Because we found this through fuzzing and do not know the subsystem
> well, I am not confident that the patch below is the best fix. It is
> just the smallest change that seemed reasonable from code inspection.
>
> diff --git a/include/sound/pcm_oss.h b/include/sound/pcm_oss.h
> --- a/include/sound/pcm_oss.h
> +++ b/include/sound/pcm_oss.h
> @@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ struct snd_pcm_oss_setup {
> };
>
> struct snd_pcm_oss_runtime {
> - unsigned params: 1, /* format/parameter change */
> - prepare: 1, /* need to prepare the operation */
> - trigger: 1, /* trigger flag */
> - sync_trigger: 1; /* sync trigger flag */
> + unsigned char params; /* format/parameter change */
> + unsigned char prepare; /* need to prepare the operation */
> + unsigned char trigger; /* trigger flag */
> + unsigned char sync_trigger; /* sync trigger flag */
> int rate; /* requested rate */
> int format; /* requested OSS format */
> unsigned int channels; /* requested channels */
Thanks for the report. I see the point, and IMO, a better fix is to
protect runtime->oss.trigger access with the mutex. We can change the
bit fields to bool as a separate patch, but it shouldn't be considered
as an ad hoc fix.
Could you submit a proper patch after verifying that it fixes your
fuzzer?
thanks,
Takashi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-23 15:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-23 14:53 [BUG] KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ALSA OSS read/poll race Jaeyoung Chung
2026-04-23 15:26 ` Takashi Iwai [this message]
2026-04-24 7:12 ` Jaeyoung Chung
2026-04-24 8:28 ` Takashi Iwai
2026-04-24 10:12 ` Jaeyoung Chung
2026-04-24 10:56 ` Takashi Iwai
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