From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
To: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/13] lib/crypto: Add documentation about zeroization of key and context data
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2026 07:22:11 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87bja6muf0.fsf@trenco.lwn.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260909115455.157093-14-thuth@redhat.com>
Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> writes:
> Add a central document about zeroization in libcrypto so we don't
> have to repeat this information in the individual kernel docs of
> the zeroization functions all over the place.
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
> ---
> .../crypto/libcrypto-zeroization.rst | 129 ++++++++++++++++++
> Documentation/crypto/libcrypto.rst | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/crypto/libcrypto-zeroization.rst
One nit...
> diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/libcrypto-zeroization.rst b/Documentation/crypto/libcrypto-zeroization.rst
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..ba9b05320ad53
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/crypto/libcrypto-zeroization.rst
> @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +
> +Crypto Key Zeroization
> +======================
> +
> +This document describes the conventions for zeroizing crypto structures in the
> +kernel.
> +
> +.. contents::
> +
> +Overview
> +--------
> +
> +Cryptographic key material and intermediate state (such as HMAC contexts) must
> +be zeroized after use to prevent sensitive data from lingering on the stack or
> +heap, where it could be leaked through memory disclosure vulnerabilities,
> +crash dumps, or cold-boot attacks.
> +
> +For memory that has been allocated with kmalloc() or a similar function,
> +kfree_sensitive() should be used instead of kfree() to release the memory.
> +
> +For other cases, the kernel provides ``memzero_explicit()`` for clearing the
> +memory. Unlike plain ``memset()``, ``memzero_explicit()`` is guaranteed not
> +to be optimized away by the compiler, even when the memory being cleared
> +appears to be dead.
Don't mark up function names, just say memzero_explicit(). The
automarkup code will then do the right thing, including cross-references
when the functions have kerneldoc documentation.
Thanks,
jon
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-09 13:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-09 11:54 [PATCH v2 00/13] libcrypto: Provide more __cleanup functions for zeroizing data Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] lib/crypto: aes: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_key and aes_enckey Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] lib/crypto: aes-xts: Provide function for zeroizing aes_xts_key Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] lib/crypto: aes-gcm: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_gcm* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] lib/crypto: aes-ccm: Provide functions for zeroizing aes_ccm* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] lib/crypto: md5: Provide a function for zeroizing hmac_md5 structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] lib/crypto: sm3: Provide a function for zeroizing the sm3_ctx structure Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] lib/crypto: blake2: Provide functions for zeroizing blake2*_ctx structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] lib/crypto: sha1: Provide functions for zeroizing hmac_sha1 structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] security: keys: trusted: always clear the hmac_sha1_ctx before returning Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] x86/purgatory: Compile purgatory.c with -D__NO_FORTIFY Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] lib/crypto: sha2: Provide functions for zeroizing SHA2 hmac_sha* structures Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] smb: client: Use hmac_sha256_zeroize_ctx function to clear hmac_sha256_ctx Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 11:54 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] lib/crypto: Add documentation about zeroization of key and context data Thomas Huth
2026-09-09 13:22 ` Jonathan Corbet [this message]
2026-09-10 9:09 ` Thomas Huth
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