From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>,
kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org,
decui@microsoft.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, daniel.lezcano@linaro.org, arnd@arndb.de,
michael.h.kelley@microsoft.com
Cc: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] drivers: hv: Mark shared pages unencrypted in SEV-SNP enlightened guest
Date: Thu, 08 Jun 2023 10:54:53 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87cz26jpuq.fsf@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2803e5d6-58bc-57f1-0721-226333238883@gmail.com>
Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com> writes:
> On 6/5/2023 8:54 PM, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote:
>>> @@ -402,7 +417,14 @@ int hv_common_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)
>>>
>>> local_irq_restore(flags);
>>>
>>> - kfree(mem);
>>> + if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp()) {
>>> + ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)mem, pgcount);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + pr_warn("Hyper-V: Failed to encrypt input arg on cpu%d: %d\n",
>>> + cpu, ret);
>>> + /* It's unsafe to free 'mem'. */
>>> + return 0;
>> Why is it unsafe to free 'mem' if ret == 0? Also, why don't we want to
>> proparate non-zero 'ret' from here to fail CPU offlining?
>>
>
> Based on Michael's patch the mem will not be freed during cpu offline.
> https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/87cz2j5zrc.fsf@redhat.com/
> So I think it's unnessary to encrypt the mem again here.
Good, you can probably include Michael's patch in your next submission
then (unless it gets merged before that).
--
Vitaly
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-08 8:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-01 15:16 [PATCH 0/9] x86/hyperv: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 1/9] x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest static key Tianyu Lan
2023-06-05 12:09 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-06-06 13:43 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-07-18 5:52 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-06-08 12:56 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-06-08 13:17 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 2/9] x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in VMBus init message Tianyu Lan
2023-06-08 13:06 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-06-08 13:21 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 3/9] x86/hyperv: Mark Hyper-V vp assist page unencrypted in SEV-SNP enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-06-05 12:13 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-06-06 15:22 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-06-06 15:49 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-06-08 13:25 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-06-08 13:44 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 4/9] drivers: hv: Mark shared pages " Tianyu Lan
2023-06-05 12:54 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-06-07 8:16 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-06-08 8:54 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2023-06-08 14:21 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 5/9] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp " Tianyu Lan
2023-06-05 13:00 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2023-06-08 13:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-08 15:15 ` [EXTERNAL] " Tianyu Lan
2023-06-27 10:57 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-06-27 11:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-27 12:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-27 13:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-28 10:53 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 6/9] clocksource: hyper-v: Mark hyperv tsc page unencrypted " Tianyu Lan
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for SEV-SNP " Tianyu Lan
2023-06-08 13:51 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-06-09 9:56 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-08 14:09 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-06-08 15:18 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 8/9] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for SEV-SNP guest Tianyu Lan
2023-06-01 15:16 ` [PATCH 9/9] x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES Tianyu Lan
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