From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists1p.gnu.org (lists1p.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CDAD2C531D0 for ; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:07:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1woMv2-0007cs-Jm; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:07:04 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1woMv0-0007cQ-VR for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:07:02 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.129.124]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1woMuz-0007lh-FJ for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:07:02 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1785164819; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=/Tf7TYq1TgIWCvYsC7tVfjbjBVlvuB8Mtjwxvh/hUKE=; b=iAr0wc6Tg+XlLQ8+pTkh5uuu0GovLtLtySK/ltFKfKVaq1mgCN+pBlZJIkPhOKA/3/MTmv Atk4OvTUajCyOqbDC7Kk8M34fCPUgVW4kQKswc8am1sYMXVPDASxSf8DIRjvYsCCMWJJ/c XkGRnQkv2aGHTMj5wMs/wzdxOW4EKKQ= Received: from mx-prod-mc-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-35-165-154-97.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [35.165.154.97]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-347-hKxtjImzOLShxkPoe50iSw-1; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 11:06:57 -0400 X-MC-Unique: hKxtjImzOLShxkPoe50iSw-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: hKxtjImzOLShxkPoe50iSw_1785164814 Received: from mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.12]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D1A901801A13; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:06:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (headnet04.pony-001.prod.iad2.dc.redhat.com [10.2.32.116]) by mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 06CE61956041; Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:06:52 +0000 (UTC) From: Cornelia Huck To: Christian Borntraeger Cc: qemu-devel , qemu-s390x , Halil Pasic , Matthew Rosato , Eric Farman , Jason Herne , Richard Henderson , Ilya Leoshkevich , David Hildenbrand , Hendrik Brueckner , Joshua Daley , Paolo Bonzini , Jared Rossi , Zhuoying Cai , =?utf-8?Q?Marc-Andr=C3=A9?= Lureau Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] more hardening fixes for s390 In-Reply-To: <49089127-7189-4bdc-bbf9-5a3ecdc99659@linux.ibm.com> Organization: "Red Hat GmbH, Sitz: Werner-von-Siemens-Ring 12, D-85630 Grasbrunn, Handelsregister: Amtsgericht =?utf-8?Q?M=C3=BCnchen=2C?= HRB 153243, =?utf-8?Q?Gesch=C3=A4ftsf=C3=BChrer=3A?= Ryan Barnhart, Charles Cachera, Avril Crosse O'Flaherty" References: <20260727115052.24289-1-borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> <87ldawsk8a.fsf@redhat.com> <49089127-7189-4bdc-bbf9-5a3ecdc99659@linux.ibm.com> User-Agent: Notmuch/0.40 (https://notmuchmail.org) Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2026 17:06:50 +0200 Message-ID: <87fr14sc8l.fsf@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.0 on 10.30.177.12 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.129.124; envelope-from=cohuck@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -36 X-Spam_score: -3.7 X-Spam_bar: --- X-Spam_report: (-3.7 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-1.58, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: qemu development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger wrote: > Am 27.07.26 um 14:14 schrieb Cornelia Huck: >> On Mon, Jul 27 2026, Christian Borntraeger wrote: >> >>> Cornelia, Eric, Matt, >>> >>> here are 5 more fixes for hardening QEMU against invalid input. Nothing >>> is strictly a security issues as defined in the policy. For example >>> https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/system/security.html says assert / >>> abort: If triggering the code path requires kernel privileges (or root >>> account access) in the guest, asserts/aborts in QEMU are a self >>> inflicted denial of service. These will not be treated as security >>> flaws, at most hardening bugs. >>> And if anyone can provide invalid boot loader content it can provide >>> anything to boot if secure boot is not available. >>> We should fix those anyway, probably even for 11.1 >> >> Fixing: yes. For 11.1: how easy are they to trigger? For the bios fixes, >> I assume you need a broken/crafted disk image; I assume that for the >> other two, you need some buggy/misbehaving guest. Did you actually >> manage to trigger this via some kind of test case? > > Easy to trigger, but only with modified guests or modified zipls. Normal > guests will not trigger those. Ok, so I think these would be suitable for the next release, but maybe with a cc:stable.