From: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To: Thomas Petazzoni via buildroot <buildroot@buildroot.org>
Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Subject: Re: [Buildroot] [git commit] package/x11r7/xserver_xorg-server: security bump to version 21.1.10
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:03:18 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87frz59cs9.fsf@48ers.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240101210511.10AB483AE6@busybox.osuosl.org> (Thomas Petazzoni via buildroot's message of "Mon, 1 Jan 2024 21:37:48 +0100")
>>>>> "Thomas" == Thomas Petazzoni via buildroot <buildroot@buildroot.org> writes:
> commit: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=9b62f5905e9f9d47363983a5bd7ef8672b21cca6
> branch: https://git.buildroot.net/buildroot/commit/?id=refs/heads/master
> Fixes the following security issues:
> 1) CVE-2023-6377: X.Org server: Out-of-bounds memory write in XKB button actions
> A device has XKB button actions for each button on the device. When a
> logical device switch happens (e.g. moving from a touchpad to a mouse), the
> server re-calculates the information available on the respective master
> device (typically the Virtual Core Pointer). This re-calculation only
> allocated enough memory for a single XKB action rather instead of enough for
> the newly active physical device's number of button. As a result, querying
> or changing the XKB button actions results in out-of-bounds memory reads and
> writes.
> This may lead to local privilege escalation if the server is run as root or
> remote code execution (e.g. x11 over ssh).
> 2) CVE-2023-6478: X.Org server: Out-of-bounds memory read in
> RRChangeOutputProperty and RRChangeProviderProperty
> This fixes an OOB read and the resulting information disclosure.
> Length calculation for the request was clipped to a 32-bit integer. With
> the correct stuff->nUnits value the expected request size was truncated,
> passing the REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE check.
> The server then proceeded with reading at least stuff->nUnits bytes
> (depending on stuff->format) from the request and stuffing whatever it finds
> into the property. In the process it would also allocate at least
>stuff-> nUnits bytes, i.e. 4GB.
> See also CVE-2022-46344 where this issue was fixed for other requests.
> For more details, see the advisory:
> https://lists.x.org/archives/xorg-announce/2023-December/003435.html
> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@bootlin.com>
Committed to 2023.02.x and 2023.11.x, thanks.
--
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-01-10 20:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-01-01 20:37 [Buildroot] [git commit] package/x11r7/xserver_xorg-server: security bump to version 21.1.10 Thomas Petazzoni via buildroot
2024-01-10 20:03 ` Peter Korsgaard [this message]
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