Re: [patch 5/9] x86/ioport: Reduce ioperm impact for sane usage further

[ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)]

Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> writes:

> On Thu, Nov 07, 2019 at 02:50:20AM -0800, hpa@zytor.com wrote:
>> You get access to the ports you are assigned, just like pages you are
>> assigned... the rest is kernel policy, or, for that matter, privileged
>> userspace (get permissions to the necessary ports, then drop privilege... the
>> usual stuff.)
>
> I agree, my point is that there's already no policy checking at the
> moment ports are assigned, hence a process having the permissions to
> request just port 0x70-0x71 to read the hwclock will also have permission
> to request access to the sensor chip a 0x2E and trigger a watchdog
> reset or stop the CPU fan. Thus any policy enforcement is solely done
> by the requesting process itself, assuming it doesn't simply use iopl()
> already, which grants everything.
>
> This is why I'm really wondering if the real use cases that need all
> this stuff still exist at all in practice.

My memory is that the applications that didn't need fine grain access to
ports would just use iopl.

Further a quick look shows that dosemu uses ioperm in a fine grained
manner.  From memory it would allow a handful of ports to allow directly
accessing a device and depended on the rest of the port accesses to be
disallowed so it could trap and emulate them.

So yes I do believe making ioperm ioperm(all) will break userspace.

Eric