From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:38160 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751918AbdBTE3l (ORCPT ); Sun, 19 Feb 2017 23:29:41 -0500 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: James Bottomley Cc: Vivek Goyal , Amir Goldstein , Djalal Harouni , Chris Mason , Theodore Tso , Josh Triplett , Andy Lutomirski , Seth Forshee , linux-fsdevel , linux-kernel , LSM List , Dongsu Park , David Herrmann , Miklos Szeredi , Alban Crequy , Al Viro , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Phil Estes References: <1486235880.2484.17.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1486235972.2484.19.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1486343891.2496.54.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170214230305.GC4017@redhat.com> <1487115955.3133.73.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170215141734.GA2101@redhat.com> <1487260318.2944.18.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <20170216164233.GC23490@redhat.com> <1487264301.2944.51.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <87a89l7f4y.fsf@xmission.com> <1487351993.4351.17.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2017 17:24:52 +1300 In-Reply-To: <1487351993.4351.17.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (James Bottomley's message of "Fri, 17 Feb 2017 09:19:53 -0800") Message-ID: <87ino5ebfv.fsf@xmission.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Subject: Re: [RFC 1/1] shiftfs: uid/gid shifting bind mount Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: James Bottomley writes: > On Fri, 2017-02-17 at 14:57 +1300, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> I think I am missing something but I completely do not understand >> that subthread that says use file marks and perform the work in the >> vfs. The problem is that fundamentally we need multiple mappings and >> I don't see a mark on a file (even an inherited mark) providing the >> mapping so I don't see the point. > > The point of the mark is that it's a statement by the system > administrator that the underlying subtree is safe to be mounted by an > unprivileged container in the containers user view (i.e. with > current_user_ns() == s_user_ns). For the unprivileged container > there's no real arbitrary s_user_ns use case because the unprivileged > container must prove it can set up the mapping, so it would likely > always be mounting from within a user_ns with the mapping it wanted. As a statement that it is ok for the unprivileged mapping code to operate that seems reasonable. I don't currently the need for such an ok from the system adminstrator, but if you need it a flag that propagates to children and child directories seems reasonable. Eric