From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman) Subject: Re: [Devel] Re: containers and cgroups mini-summit @ Linux Plumbers Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2012 12:38:16 -0700 Message-ID: <87ipdauxcn.fsf@xmission.com> References: <4FFDF321.4030103@openvz.org> <500FD022.6000608@parallels.com> <877gtr6uo5.fsf@xmission.com> <50110AE6.2080701@parallels.com> <50110D53.2090407@parallels.com> <874nou6bx1.fsf@xmission.com> <20120726181629.GB17824@serge-laptop> Mime-Version: 1.0 Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20120726181629.GB17824@serge-laptop> (Serge Hallyn's message of "Thu, 26 Jul 2012 13:16:29 -0500") Sender: cgroups-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org List-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Serge Hallyn Cc: Glauber Costa , Frederic Weisbecker , Balbir Singh , Pavel Emelyanov , Suleiman-GEFAQzZX7r8dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, Daniel Lezcano , Tim Hockin , Greg Thelen , Paul Turner , devel-GEFAQzZX7r8dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, Souhlal , Tejun Heo , Dave Kleikamp , Dhaval Giani , cgroups-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki , Maxim-GEFAQzZX7r8dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org, Johannes Weiner , Rohit Seth , Patlasov Serge Hallyn writes: > (Sorry, please disregard my last email :) > > Yes, what we do now in ubuntu quantal is the bind mounts you mention, > and only optionally (using a startup hook). > Each container is brought up in say > /sys/fs/cgroup/devices/lxc/container1/container1.real, and that dir is > bind-mounted under /sys/fs/cgroup/devices in the guest. The guest > is not allowed to mount cgroup fs himself. > > It's certainly not ideal (and in cases where cgroup allows you to > raise your own limits, worthless). The 'fake cgroup root' has been > mentioned before to address this. Definately worth discussing. It is going to be interesting to see how all of the unprivileged operations work when the user-namespaces start allowing unprivileged users to do things (3.7 timeframe I hope). I can see it making things both easier and harder. I would hope not actually being root will make it easier to keep from raising your own limits. Running some operations as non-root will catch other places off guard where people were definitely expecting nothing of the kind. There are a couple of networking memory limits exposed through sysctl that I don't expect we want everyone changing, that I need to figure out how to separate out from the rest. A concept that hasn't existed before. Eric