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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, mingo@redhat.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com, nikunj@amd.com, Santosh.Shukla@amd.com,
	Vasant.Hegde@amd.com, Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	peterz@infradead.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com,
	huibo.wang@amd.com, naveen.rao@amd.com
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 05/17] x86/apic: Add update_vector callback for Secure AVIC
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2025 15:27:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87jz8i31dv.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250226090525.231882-6-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>

On Wed, Feb 26 2025 at 14:35, Neeraj Upadhyay wrote:
> Add update_vector callback to set/clear ALLOWED_IRR field in
> the APIC backing page. The ALLOWED_IRR field indicates the
> interrupt vectors which the guest allows the hypervisor to
> send (typically for emulated devices). Interrupt vectors used
> exclusively by the guest itself (like IPI vectors) should not
> be allowed to be injected into the guest for security reasons.
> The update_vector callback is invoked from APIC vector domain
> whenever a vector is allocated, freed or moved.

Your changelog tells a lot about the WHAT. Please read and follow the
documentation, which describes how a change log should be structured.

https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/maintainer-tip.html#changelog

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
> index 72fa4bb78f0a..e0c9505e05f8 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c
> @@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ static void apic_update_vector(struct irq_data *irqd, unsigned int newvec,
>  		apicd->prev_cpu = apicd->cpu;
>  		WARN_ON_ONCE(apicd->cpu == newcpu);
>  	} else {
> +		if (apic->update_vector)
> +			apic->update_vector(apicd->cpu, apicd->vector, false);
>  		irq_matrix_free(vector_matrix, apicd->cpu, apicd->vector,
>  				managed);
>  	}
> @@ -183,6 +185,8 @@ static void apic_update_vector(struct irq_data *irqd, unsigned int newvec,
>  	apicd->cpu = newcpu;
>  	BUG_ON(!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(per_cpu(vector_irq, newcpu)[newvec]));
>  	per_cpu(vector_irq, newcpu)[newvec] = desc;
> +	if (apic->update_vector)
> +		apic->update_vector(apicd->cpu, apicd->vector, true);

A trivial

static inline void apic_update_vector(....)
{
        if (apic->update_vector)
           ....
}

would be too easy to read and add not enough line count, right?

>  static void vector_assign_managed_shutdown(struct irq_data *irqd)
> @@ -528,11 +532,15 @@ static bool vector_configure_legacy(unsigned int virq, struct irq_data *irqd,
>  	if (irqd_is_activated(irqd)) {
>  		trace_vector_setup(virq, true, 0);
>  		apic_update_irq_cfg(irqd, apicd->vector, apicd->cpu);
> +		if (apic->update_vector)
> +			apic->update_vector(apicd->cpu, apicd->vector, true);
>  	} else {
>  		/* Release the vector */
>  		apicd->can_reserve = true;
>  		irqd_set_can_reserve(irqd);
>  		clear_irq_vector(irqd);
> +		if (apic->update_vector)
> +			apic->update_vector(apicd->cpu, apicd->vector, false);
>  		realloc = true;

This is as incomplete as it gets. None of the other code paths which
invoke clear_irq_vector() nor those which invoke free_moved_vector() are
mopping up the leftovers in the backing page.

And no, you don't sprinkle this nonsense all over the call sites. There
is only a very limited number of functions which are involed in setting
up and tearing down a vector. Doing this at the call sites is a
guarantee for missing out as you demonstrated.

> +#define VEC_POS(v)	((v) & (32 - 1))
> +#define REG_POS(v)	(((v) >> 5) << 4)

This is unreadable, undocumented and incomprehensible garbage.

>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(void *, apic_backing_page);
>  
>  struct apic_id_node {
> @@ -192,6 +195,22 @@ static void x2apic_savic_send_IPI_mask_allbutself(const struct cpumask *mask, in
>  	__send_IPI_mask(mask, vector, APIC_DEST_ALLBUT);
>  }
>  
> +static void x2apic_savic_update_vector(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int vector, bool set)
> +{
> +	void *backing_page;
> +	unsigned long *reg;
> +	int reg_off;
> +
> +	backing_page = per_cpu(apic_backing_page, cpu);
> +	reg_off = SAVIC_ALLOWED_IRR_OFFSET + REG_POS(vector);
> +	reg = (unsigned long *)((char *)backing_page + reg_off);
> +
> +	if (set)
> +		test_and_set_bit(VEC_POS(vector), reg);
> +	else
> +		test_and_clear_bit(VEC_POS(vector), reg);
> +}

What's the test_and_ for if you ignore the return value anyway?

Als I have no idea what SAVIC_ALLOWED_IRR_OFFSET means. Whether it's
something from the datashit or a made up thing does not matter. It's
patently non-informative.

Again:

struct apic_page {
	union {
		u32	regs[NR_APIC_REGS];
		u8	bytes[PAGE_SIZE];
	};
};                

       struct apic_page *ap = this_cpu_ptr(apic_page);
       unsigned long *sirr;

       /*
        * apic_page.regs[SAVIC_ALLOWED_IRR_OFFSET...] is an array of
        * consecutive 32-bit registers, which represents a vector bitmap.
        */
        sirr = (unsigned long *) &ap->regs[SAVIC_ALLOWED_IRR_OFFSET];
        if (set)
        	set_bit(sirr, vector);
        else
        	clear_bit(sirr, vector);

See how code suddenly becomes self explaining, obvious and
comprehensible?

Thanks,

        tglx

  reply	other threads:[~2025-03-21 14:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-26  9:05 [RFC v2 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC Guest Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 01/17] x86/apic: Add new driver for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-20 15:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21  3:44     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 16:09         ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 17:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-01  5:12             ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-02  9:47               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-02 10:34                 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-07 13:17                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-07 16:17                     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 12:44     ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:52       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-21 12:53   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:25     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 02/17] x86/apic: Initialize Secure AVIC APIC backing page Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:08   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 13:49     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 16:32   ` Francesco Lavra
2025-03-21 17:00     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 03/17] x86/apic: Populate .read()/.write() callbacks of Secure AVIC driver Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:38   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 14:00     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 04/17] x86/apic: Initialize APIC ID for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 13:52   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 15:11     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 05/17] x86/apic: Add update_vector callback " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 14:27   ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2025-03-21 15:35     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-25 12:10       ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-27 10:27         ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 11:17           ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-27 12:18             ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 12:30               ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 06/17] x86/apic: Add support to send IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-27 11:11   ` kernel test robot
2025-03-21 15:06   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-01 10:25     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 07/17] x86/apic: Support LAPIC timer " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 08/17] x86/sev: Initialize VGIF for secondary VCPUs " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 09/17] x86/apic: Add support to send NMI IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 10/17] x86/apic: Allow NMI to be injected from hypervisor " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 11/17] x86/sev: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 12/17] x86/apic: Read and write LVT* APIC registers from HV for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 13/17] x86/apic: Handle EOI writes " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:41   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-21 17:11     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 10:48       ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 12:20         ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-03-27 14:19           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 16:54             ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 14/17] x86/apic: Add kexec support for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-03-21 15:48   ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-01 10:35     ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-04-01 18:31       ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-04-02  2:40         ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 15/17] x86/apic: Enable Secure AVIC in Control MSR Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 16/17] x86/sev: Prevent SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR interception for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-02-26  9:05 ` [RFC v2 17/17] x86/sev: Indicate SEV-SNP guest supports Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay

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