All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: "Yan, Zheng" <ukernel@gmail.com>,
	ceph-devel <ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] ceph: guard against __ceph_remove_cap races
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 14:11:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87mtzodluu.fsf@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <05512d3c3bf95eb551ea8ae4982b180f8c4deb0d.camel@kernel.org> (Jeff Layton's message of "Wed, 11 Nov 2020 08:09:17 -0500")

Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> writes:

> On Wed, 2020-11-11 at 11:08 +0000, Luis Henriques wrote:
>> Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> writes:
>> 
>> > On Sat, 2019-12-14 at 10:46 +0800, Yan, Zheng wrote:
>> > > On Fri, Dec 13, 2019 at 1:32 AM Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> wrote:
>> > > > I believe it's possible that we could end up with racing calls to
>> > > > __ceph_remove_cap for the same cap. If that happens, the cap->ci
>> > > > pointer will be zereoed out and we can hit a NULL pointer dereference.
>> > > > 
>> > > > Once we acquire the s_cap_lock, check for the ci pointer being NULL,
>> > > > and just return without doing anything if it is.
>> > > > 
>> > > > URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/43272
>> > > > Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
>> > > > ---
>> > > >  fs/ceph/caps.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++-----
>> > > >  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>> > > > 
>> > > > This is the only scenario that made sense to me in light of Ilya's
>> > > > analysis on the tracker above. I could be off here though -- the locking
>> > > > around this code is horrifically complex, and I could be missing what
>> > > > should guard against this scenario.
>> > > > 
>> > > 
>> > > I think the simpler fix is,  in trim_caps_cb, check if cap-ci is
>> > > non-null before calling __ceph_remove_cap().  this should work because
>> > > __ceph_remove_cap() is always called inside i_ceph_lock
>> > > 
>> > 
>> > Is that sufficient though? The stack trace in the bug shows it being
>> > called by ceph_trim_caps, but I think we could hit the same problem with
>> > other __ceph_remove_cap callers, if they happen to race in at the right
>> > time.
>> 
>> Sorry for resurrecting this old thread, but we just got a report with this
>> issue on a kernel that includes commit d6e47819721a ("ceph: hold
>> i_ceph_lock when removing caps for freeing inode").
>> 
>> Looking at the code, I believe Zheng's suggestion should work as I don't
>> see any __ceph_remove_cap callers that don't hold the i_ceph_lock.  So,
>> would something like the diff bellow be acceptable?
>> 
>> Cheers,
>
> I'm still not convinced that's the correct fix.
>
> Why would trim_caps_cb be subject to this race when other
> __ceph_remove_cap callers are not? Maybe the right fix is to test for a
> NULL cap->ci in __ceph_remove_cap and just return early if it is?

I see, you're probably right.  Looking again at the code I see that there
are two possible places where this race could occur, and they're both used
as callbacks in ceph_iterate_session_caps.  They are trim_caps_cb and
remove_session_caps_cb.

These callbacks get the struct ceph_cap as argument and only then they
will acquire i_ceph_lock.  Since this isn't protected with
session->s_cap_lock, I guess this could be where the race window is, where
cap->ci can be set to NULL.

Bellow is the patch you suggested.  If you think that's acceptable I can
resend with a proper commit message.

Cheers,
-- 
Luis

diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c
index ded4229c314a..917dfaf0bd01 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/caps.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c
@@ -1140,12 +1140,17 @@ void __ceph_remove_cap(struct ceph_cap *cap, bool queue_release)
 {
 	struct ceph_mds_session *session = cap->session;
 	struct ceph_inode_info *ci = cap->ci;
-	struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc =
-		ceph_sb_to_client(ci->vfs_inode.i_sb)->mdsc;
+	struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc;
+
 	int removed = 0;
 
+	if (!ci)
+		return;
+
 	dout("__ceph_remove_cap %p from %p\n", cap, &ci->vfs_inode);
 
+	mdsc = ceph_sb_to_client(ci->vfs_inode.i_sb)->mdsc;
+
 	/* remove from inode's cap rbtree, and clear auth cap */
 	rb_erase(&cap->ci_node, &ci->i_caps);
 	if (ci->i_auth_cap == cap) {

  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-11 14:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20191212173159.35013-1-jlayton@kernel.org>
     [not found] ` <CAAM7YAmquOg5ESMAMa5y0gGAR-UAivYF8m+nqrJNmK=SzG6+wA@mail.gmail.com>
     [not found]   ` <64d5a16d920098122144e0df8e03df0cadfb2784.camel@kernel.org>
2020-11-11 11:08     ` [RFC PATCH] ceph: guard against __ceph_remove_cap races Luis Henriques
2020-11-11 13:09       ` Jeff Layton
2020-11-11 14:11         ` Luis Henriques [this message]
2020-11-11 14:24           ` Jeff Layton
2020-11-11 14:34             ` Luis Henriques

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=87mtzodluu.fsf@suse.de \
    --to=lhenriques@suse.de \
    --cc=ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=idryomov@redhat.com \
    --cc=jlayton@kernel.org \
    --cc=ukernel@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.