From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman) Subject: [GIT PULL] namespace chnages for 3.12 Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 14:07:29 -0700 Message-ID: <87mwnrht9q.fsf@xmission.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org Errors-To: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org To: Linus Torvalds Cc: linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Linux Containers , linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org List-Id: containers.vger.kernel.org Linus, Please pull the for-linus git tree from: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git for-linus HEAD: c7b96acf1456ef127fef461fcfedb54b81fecfbb userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy This tree is against v3.11-rc1 This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace. Eric W. Biederman (10): vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc//ns/mnt between namespaces userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy Raphael S.Carvalho (1): kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. Serge Hallyn (1): capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged fs/namespace.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/open.c | 2 +- fs/pnode.h | 5 +- fs/proc/root.c | 6 ++- fs/sysfs/mount.c | 11 +++- include/linux/capability.h | 1 - include/linux/fs.h | 1 + include/linux/kobject_ns.h | 2 + include/linux/mount.h | 1 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 - ipc/namespace.c | 2 +- kernel/capability.c | 12 ---- kernel/fork.c | 5 -- kernel/groups.c | 2 +- kernel/nsproxy.c | 36 ++++-------- kernel/pid.c | 1 + kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +- kernel/sys.c | 20 +++--- kernel/uid16.c | 2 +- kernel/user.c | 2 - kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 - kernel/utsname.c | 2 +- lib/kobject.c | 15 +++++ net/core/net-sysfs.c | 8 +++ net/core/net_namespace.c | 2 +- net/core/scm.c | 4 +- security/commoncap.c | 10 ++-- 27 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-) From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756478Ab3IEVHl (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 Sep 2013 17:07:41 -0400 Received: from out03.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.233]:58520 "EHLO out03.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753678Ab3IEVHh (ORCPT ); Thu, 5 Sep 2013 17:07:37 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Linus Torvalds Cc: Linux Containers , , , "Serge E. Hallyn" Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 14:07:29 -0700 Message-ID: <87mwnrht9q.fsf@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19dCbzVCpV8zMUHNobaGkcDP1Q+/vvtUuo= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.154.105 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * -3.0 BAYES_00 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 0 to 1% * [score: 0.0000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 1.2 XMSubMetaSxObfu_03 Obfuscated Sexy Noun-People * 1.0 XMSubMetaSx_00 1+ Sexy Words X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: ;Linus Torvalds X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: [GIT PULL] namespace chnages for 3.12 X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Linus, Please pull the for-linus git tree from: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git for-linus HEAD: c7b96acf1456ef127fef461fcfedb54b81fecfbb userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy This tree is against v3.11-rc1 This is an assorted mishmash of small cleanups, enhancements and bug fixes. The major theme is user namespace mount restrictions. nsown_capable is killed as it encourages not thinking about details that need to be considered. A very hard to hit pid namespace exiting bug was finally tracked and fixed. A couple of cleanups to the basic namespace infrastructure. Finally there is an enhancement that makes per user namespace capabilities usable as capabilities, and an enhancement that allows the per userns root to nice other processes in the user namespace. Eric W. Biederman (10): vfs: Lock in place mounts from more privileged users proc: Restrict mounting the proc filesystem vfs: Don't copy mount bind mounts of /proc//ns/mnt between namespaces userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted sysfs: Restrict mounting sysfs pidns: Fix hang in zap_pid_ns_processes by sending a potentially extra wakeup namespaces: Simplify copy_namespaces so it is clear what is going on. userns: Allow PR_CAPBSET_DROP in a user namespace. pidns: Don't have unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) imply CLONE_THREAD userns: Kill nsown_capable it makes the wrong thing easy Raphael S.Carvalho (1): kernel/nsproxy.c: Improving a snippet of code. Serge Hallyn (1): capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged fs/namespace.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- fs/open.c | 2 +- fs/pnode.h | 5 +- fs/proc/root.c | 6 ++- fs/sysfs/mount.c | 11 +++- include/linux/capability.h | 1 - include/linux/fs.h | 1 + include/linux/kobject_ns.h | 2 + include/linux/mount.h | 1 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 - ipc/namespace.c | 2 +- kernel/capability.c | 12 ---- kernel/fork.c | 5 -- kernel/groups.c | 2 +- kernel/nsproxy.c | 36 ++++-------- kernel/pid.c | 1 + kernel/pid_namespace.c | 2 +- kernel/sys.c | 20 +++--- kernel/uid16.c | 2 +- kernel/user.c | 2 - kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 - kernel/utsname.c | 2 +- lib/kobject.c | 15 +++++ net/core/net-sysfs.c | 8 +++ net/core/net_namespace.c | 2 +- net/core/scm.c | 4 +- security/commoncap.c | 10 ++-- 27 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)