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From: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.de>
To: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
Cc: ltp@lists.linux.it
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH v6] fsconfig03: New test CVE-2022-0185
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2023 08:49:33 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87r0uaupxp.fsf@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230228032745.16595-1-wegao@suse.com>

Hello,

Merged with minor fixes, thanks!

See comments below.

Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com> writes:

> There are reproducers available for CVE-2022-0185
> https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/14
>
> Also with links or even a zip file for an exploit
> https://github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185
>
> The exploits are kind of complicated as they try to be complete,
> but the exploitation vector is the fsconfig() syscall,
> this case used for add some coverage to that to detect it.
>
> When kernel < v5.15.16, you can easily reproduce crash use test case
> without check error and return logic in loop.
>
> I have used this test case trigger 5.14.1 kernel crash with ext2/4.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
> Reviewed-by: Richard Palethorpe <rpalethorpe@suse.com>
> Reviewed-by: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz>
> ---
>  runtest/cve                                   |  2 +
>  runtest/syscalls                              |  1 +
>  testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/.gitignore |  1 +
>  .../kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/fsconfig03.c     | 79 +++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 83 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/fsconfig03.c
>
> diff --git a/runtest/cve b/runtest/cve
> index 1ba63c2a7..7da3ff853 100644
> --- a/runtest/cve
> +++ b/runtest/cve
> @@ -77,3 +77,5 @@ cve-2022-2590 dirtyc0w_shmem
>  # Tests below may cause kernel memory leak
>  cve-2020-25704 perf_event_open03
>  cve-2022-4378 cve-2022-4378
> +# Tests below may cause kernel crash

rm this comment, almost all the CVE tests can cause a crash.

I'm not sure why there is a comment about memory leak above. There is no
reason to ever comment about such things in the runtest file.

> +cve-2022-0185 fsconfig03
> diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
> index ae37a1192..b4cde8071 100644
> --- a/runtest/syscalls
> +++ b/runtest/syscalls
> @@ -383,6 +383,7 @@ fremovexattr02 fremovexattr02
>  
>  fsconfig01 fsconfig01
>  fsconfig02 fsconfig02
> +fsconfig03 fsconfig03
>  
>  fsmount01 fsmount01
>  fsmount02 fsmount02
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/.gitignore
> index 2bc54b827..cfedae5f7 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/.gitignore
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/.gitignore
> @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
>  /fsconfig01
>  /fsconfig02
> +/fsconfig03
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/fsconfig03.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/fsconfig03.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..2d9183dd6
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/fsconfig/fsconfig03.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2022 Alejandro Guerrero <aguerrero@...lys.com>

Added the full domain which is qualys.com.

> + * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +
> +/*\
> + * [Description]
> + *
> + * Test for CVE-2022-0185.
> + *
> + * References links:

Added blank line here as suggested by pvorel

> + * - https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/01/25/14
> + * - https://github.com/Crusaders-of-Rust/CVE-2022-0185
> + */
> +
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "lapi/fsmount.h"
> +
> +#define MNTPOINT	"mntpoint"
> +
> +static int fd = -1;
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> +	fsopen_supported_by_kernel();
> +}
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> +	char *val = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA";
> +	long pagesize;
> +
> +	TEST(fd = fsopen(tst_device->fs_type, 0));
> +	if (fd == -1)
> +		tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "fsopen() failed");
> +
> +	pagesize = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
> +	if (pagesize == -1)
> +		tst_brk(TBROK, "sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE) failed");
> +
> +	for (size_t i = 0; i < 5000; i++) {
> +		/* use same logic in kernel legacy_parse_param function */
> +		const size_t len = i * (strlen(val) + 2) + (strlen(val) + 1) + 2;
> +
> +		if (!strcmp(tst_device->fs_type, "btrfs") && len <= (size_t)pagesize)
> +			TST_EXP_PASS_SILENT(fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "\x00", val, 0));
> +		else
> +			TST_EXP_FAIL_SILENT(fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, "\x00", val, 0),
> +					    EINVAL);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (fd != -1)
> +		SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> +	if (tst_taint_check() != 0)

Removed the unecessary '!= 0'

> +		tst_res(TFAIL, "kernel has issues on %s",
> +			tst_device->fs_type);
> +	else
> +		tst_res(TPASS, "kernel seems to be fine on %s",
> +			tst_device->fs_type);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> +	.test_all = run,
> +	.setup = setup,
> +	.needs_root = 1,
> +	.format_device = 1,
> +	.mntpoint = MNTPOINT,
> +	.all_filesystems = 1,
> +	.taint_check = TST_TAINT_W | TST_TAINT_D,
> +	.skip_filesystems = (const char *const []){"ntfs", "vfat", NULL},
> +	.tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
> +		{"linux-git", "722d94847de29"},
> +		{"CVE", "2022-0185"},
> +		{}
> +	}
> +};


-- 
Thank you,
Richard.

-- 
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-28  8:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-01-29 11:50 [LTP] [PATCH v1] fsconfig: New case cover CVE-2022-0185 Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-01 12:49 ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-06 10:38   ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-06 16:19     ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-08  9:01       ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-08 15:48         ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-09  2:25           ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-09 10:10             ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 11:37               ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-06 16:42     ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-09 13:19 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-09 14:15   ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-09 14:27     ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 14:40       ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-09 14:53         ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 14:35     ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-09 14:52       ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-02-09 15:18         ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-10  8:22         ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-10  9:00           ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-13  1:09   ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] fsconfig03: New test CVE-2022-0185 Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-14 11:05     ` Richard Palethorpe
2023-02-16  9:42       ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-16 12:09         ` Richard Palethorpe
2023-02-16 12:54           ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-16 23:52     ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-17  7:48       ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-17  8:47       ` Petr Vorel
2023-02-17  9:19         ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-27 16:20       ` Richard Palethorpe
2023-02-28  3:22       ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-28  3:27         ` [LTP] [PATCH v6] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-02-28  8:49           ` Richard Palethorpe [this message]
2023-03-01 13:46           ` Martin Doucha
2023-03-01 14:12             ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-02  1:45           ` [LTP] [PATCH v7] fsconfig03: SKIP check return value for old kernel Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-02 10:00             ` Petr Vorel
2023-03-02 10:45               ` Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-02 10:03             ` Petr Vorel
2023-03-04  2:03             ` [LTP] [PATCH v8] " Wei Gao via ltp
2023-03-07  9:23               ` Petr Vorel

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