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From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Fuqian Huang <huangfq.daxian@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Sean Christopherson" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	"Wanpeng Li" <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	"Jim Mattson" <jmattson@google.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized stack contents
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 12:53:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87r24leqf4.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABXRUiTD=yRRQFfSdS=2e9QaO-PEgvZ=LBar927rL04G59nHxQ@mail.gmail.com>

Fuqian Huang <huangfq.daxian@gmail.com> writes:

> Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> 於 2019年9月12日週四 下午4:51寫道:
>>
>> Fuqian Huang <huangfq.daxian@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>> > Emulation of VMPTRST can incorrectly inject a page fault
>> > when passed an operand that points to an MMIO address.
>> > The page fault will use uninitialized kernel stack memory
>> > as the CR2 and error code.
>> >
>> > The right behavior would be to abort the VM with a KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR
>> > exit to userspace;
>>
>> Hm, why so? KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR is basically an error in KVM, this
>> is not a proper reaction to a userspace-induced condition (or ever).
>>
>> I also looked at VMPTRST's description in Intel's manual and I can't
>> find and explicit limitation like "this must be normal memory". We're
>> just supposed to inject #PF "If a page fault occurs in accessing the
>> memory destination operand."
>>
>> In case it seems to be too cumbersome to handle VMPTRST to MMIO and we
>> think that nobody should be doing that I'd rather prefer injecting #GP.
>>
>> Please tell me what I'm missing :-)
>
> I found it during the code review, and it looks like the problem the
> commit 353c0956a618 ("KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized
> stack contents (CVE-2019-7222)")
> mentions. So I fixed it in a similar way.
>

Oh, yes, I'm not against the fix at all, I was just wondering about why
you think we need to kill the guest in this case.

-- 
Vitaly

  reply	other threads:[~2019-09-12 10:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-12  4:18 [PATCH] KVM: x86: work around leak of uninitialized stack contents Fuqian Huang
2019-09-12  8:51 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-09-12  8:56   ` Fuqian Huang
2019-09-12 10:53     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2019-09-12 12:02       ` Fuqian Huang
2019-09-12 16:20   ` Jim Mattson
2019-09-12 16:44     ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2019-09-12 21:20 ` Jim Mattson
2019-09-12 23:52   ` Sean Christopherson
2019-09-13  9:07     ` Paolo Bonzini

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