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diff for duplicates of <87r2peaqf0.fsf@xmission.com>

diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N1/1.txt
index 5db6191..bf153b8 100644
--- a/a/1.txt
+++ b/N1/1.txt
@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >> >> > > configuration that IMA has a reasonable expectation of seeing all of
 >> >> > > the changes it would be nice if we can say please trust this mount.
 >> >> > 
->> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change.  This was one of the reasons
+>> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change. ?This was one of the reasons
 >> >> > for the original patch set's not using the cached IMA results.
 >> >> > 
 >> >> > Even in the case of a trusted mounter and not using IMA cached
 >> >> > results, there are no guarantees that the data read to calculate the
->> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read.  In some
+>> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read. ?In some
 >> >> > environments this might be an acceptable risk, while in others not.
 >> >> 
 >> >> So for the cases where it's not, there should be an IMA option or policy
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >> >> trusted, with the default being both SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES and
 >> >> SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER must be true to not trust, right?
 >> >
->> > Right.  To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:
+>> > Right. ?To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:
 >> > 1. Fail signature verification on unprivileged non-init root mounted
 >> > file systems.
 >> >
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >> > (always enabled)
 >> >
 >> > 2. Permit signature verification on privileged file system mounts in a
->> > secure system environment.  Willing to accept the risk.  Does not rely
+>> > secure system environment. ?Willing to accept the risk. ?Does not rely
 >> > on cached integrity results, but forces re-evaluation.
 >> >
 >> > flags: SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES, not SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER or
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >
 > This simply sounds like a performance improvement to the second
 > scenario, where instead of *always* forcing re-validation, it checks
-> the i_version.  Perhaps based on a different flag.
+> the i_version. ?Perhaps based on a different flag.
 
 As I understand the second scenario SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES
 is set, which implies that the filesystem is lacking something for IMA
@@ -88,3 +88,7 @@ I add the fourth case so that we can get a solid definition of
 SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES.
 
 Eric
+--
+To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
+the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
+More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest
index a91650d..deef58d 100644
--- a/a/content_digest
+++ b/N1/content_digest
@@ -9,18 +9,9 @@
  "ref\087mv02c65y.fsf@xmission.com\0"
  "ref\01519253867.19593.25.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com\0"
  "From\0ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)\0"
- "Subject\0Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] ima: fail signature verification on untrusted filesystems\0"
+ "Subject\0[PATCH v1 1/2] ima: fail signature verification on untrusted filesystems\0"
  "Date\0Wed, 21 Feb 2018 17:12:03 -0600\0"
- "To\0Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>\0"
- "Cc\0Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>"
-  James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-  linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
-  linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
-  linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
-  Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
-  Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
-  Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
- " Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>\0"
+ "To\0linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org\0"
  "\00:1\0"
  "b\0"
  "Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:\n"
@@ -32,12 +23,12 @@
  ">> >> > > configuration that IMA has a reasonable expectation of seeing all of\n"
  ">> >> > > the changes it would be nice if we can say please trust this mount.\n"
  ">> >> > \n"
- ">> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change.  This was one of the reasons\n"
+ ">> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change. ?This was one of the reasons\n"
  ">> >> > for the original patch set's not using the cached IMA results.\n"
  ">> >> > \n"
  ">> >> > Even in the case of a trusted mounter and not using IMA cached\n"
  ">> >> > results, there are no guarantees that the data read to calculate the\n"
- ">> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read.  In some\n"
+ ">> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read. ?In some\n"
  ">> >> > environments this might be an acceptable risk, while in others not.\n"
  ">> >> \n"
  ">> >> So for the cases where it's not, there should be an IMA option or policy\n"
@@ -45,7 +36,7 @@
  ">> >> trusted, with the default being both SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES and\n"
  ">> >> SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER must be true to not trust, right?\n"
  ">> >\n"
- ">> > Right.  To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:\n"
+ ">> > Right. ?To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:\n"
  ">> > 1. Fail signature verification on unprivileged non-init root mounted\n"
  ">> > file systems.\n"
  ">> >\n"
@@ -53,7 +44,7 @@
  ">> > (always enabled)\n"
  ">> >\n"
  ">> > 2. Permit signature verification on privileged file system mounts in a\n"
- ">> > secure system environment.  Willing to accept the risk.  Does not rely\n"
+ ">> > secure system environment. ?Willing to accept the risk. ?Does not rely\n"
  ">> > on cached integrity results, but forces re-evaluation.\n"
  ">> >\n"
  ">> > flags: SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES, not SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER or\n"
@@ -94,7 +85,7 @@
  ">\n"
  "> This simply sounds like a performance improvement to the second\n"
  "> scenario, where instead of *always* forcing re-validation, it checks\n"
- "> the i_version.  Perhaps based on a different flag.\n"
+ "> the i_version. ?Perhaps based on a different flag.\n"
  "\n"
  "As I understand the second scenario SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES\n"
  "is set, which implies that the filesystem is lacking something for IMA\n"
@@ -112,6 +103,10 @@
  "I add the fourth case so that we can get a solid definition of\n"
  "SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES.\n"
  "\n"
- Eric
+ "Eric\n"
+ "--\n"
+ "To unsubscribe from this list: send the line \"unsubscribe linux-security-module\" in\n"
+ "the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org\n"
+ More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
 
-fb070071d21ea6ae971672825b5407e0c54ebfad25743d6c5ee199076f413521
+399b8feabead46666b7cf48af5c86d6c642d51f4fae0aa894d9ab22d813fb81a

diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N2/1.txt
index 5db6191..98ab5f5 100644
--- a/a/1.txt
+++ b/N2/1.txt
@@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >> >> > > configuration that IMA has a reasonable expectation of seeing all of
 >> >> > > the changes it would be nice if we can say please trust this mount.
 >> >> > 
->> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change.  This was one of the reasons
+>> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change.  This was one of the reasons
 >> >> > for the original patch set's not using the cached IMA results.
 >> >> > 
 >> >> > Even in the case of a trusted mounter and not using IMA cached
 >> >> > results, there are no guarantees that the data read to calculate the
->> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read.  In some
+>> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read.  In some
 >> >> > environments this might be an acceptable risk, while in others not.
 >> >> 
 >> >> So for the cases where it's not, there should be an IMA option or policy
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >> >> trusted, with the default being both SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES and
 >> >> SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER must be true to not trust, right?
 >> >
->> > Right.  To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:
+>> > Right.  To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:
 >> > 1. Fail signature verification on unprivileged non-init root mounted
 >> > file systems.
 >> >
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >> > (always enabled)
 >> >
 >> > 2. Permit signature verification on privileged file system mounts in a
->> > secure system environment.  Willing to accept the risk.  Does not rely
+>> > secure system environment.  Willing to accept the risk.  Does not rely
 >> > on cached integrity results, but forces re-evaluation.
 >> >
 >> > flags: SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES, not SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER or
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >
 > This simply sounds like a performance improvement to the second
 > scenario, where instead of *always* forcing re-validation, it checks
-> the i_version.  Perhaps based on a different flag.
+> the i_version.  Perhaps based on a different flag.
 
 As I understand the second scenario SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES
 is set, which implies that the filesystem is lacking something for IMA
diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N2/content_digest
index a91650d..19f84cd 100644
--- a/a/content_digest
+++ b/N2/content_digest
@@ -32,12 +32,12 @@
  ">> >> > > configuration that IMA has a reasonable expectation of seeing all of\n"
  ">> >> > > the changes it would be nice if we can say please trust this mount.\n"
  ">> >> > \n"
- ">> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change.  This was one of the reasons\n"
+ ">> >> > IMA has no way of detecting file change. \302\240This was one of the reasons\n"
  ">> >> > for the original patch set's not using the cached IMA results.\n"
  ">> >> > \n"
  ">> >> > Even in the case of a trusted mounter and not using IMA cached\n"
  ">> >> > results, there are no guarantees that the data read to calculate the\n"
- ">> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read.  In some\n"
+ ">> >> > file hash, will be the same as what is subsequently read. \302\240In some\n"
  ">> >> > environments this might be an acceptable risk, while in others not.\n"
  ">> >> \n"
  ">> >> So for the cases where it's not, there should be an IMA option or policy\n"
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
  ">> >> trusted, with the default being both SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES and\n"
  ">> >> SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER must be true to not trust, right?\n"
  ">> >\n"
- ">> > Right.  To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:\n"
+ ">> > Right. \302\240To summarize, we've identified 3 scenarios:\n"
  ">> > 1. Fail signature verification on unprivileged non-init root mounted\n"
  ">> > file systems.\n"
  ">> >\n"
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
  ">> > (always enabled)\n"
  ">> >\n"
  ">> > 2. Permit signature verification on privileged file system mounts in a\n"
- ">> > secure system environment.  Willing to accept the risk.  Does not rely\n"
+ ">> > secure system environment. \302\240Willing to accept the risk. \302\240Does not rely\n"
  ">> > on cached integrity results, but forces re-evaluation.\n"
  ">> >\n"
  ">> > flags: SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES, not SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER or\n"
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@
  ">\n"
  "> This simply sounds like a performance improvement to the second\n"
  "> scenario, where instead of *always* forcing re-validation, it checks\n"
- "> the i_version.  Perhaps based on a different flag.\n"
+ "> the i_version. \302\240Perhaps based on a different flag.\n"
  "\n"
  "As I understand the second scenario SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURES\n"
  "is set, which implies that the filesystem is lacking something for IMA\n"
@@ -114,4 +114,4 @@
  "\n"
  Eric
 
-fb070071d21ea6ae971672825b5407e0c54ebfad25743d6c5ee199076f413521
+d67b1a75bfac7c1b35ab99c8ae1a5adbdef5f80307a8b0ae3226bbb798e8fdbd

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