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From: "Toke Høiland-Jørgensen" <toke@redhat.com>
To: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 2/4] bpf: test_run: Use system page pool for XDP live frame mode
Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2024 15:34:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87sf01l09r.fsf@toke.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5a0db8a6-6d73-48a6-8824-3191657ff11a@kernel.org>

Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@kernel.org> writes:

> On 21/02/2024 15.48, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
>> Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> writes:
>> 
>>> The cookie is a random 128-bit value, which means the probability that
>>> we will get accidental collisions (which would lead to recycling the
>>> wrong page values and reading garbage) is on the order of 2^-128. This
>>> is in the "won't happen before the heat death of the universe" range, so
>>> this marking is safe for the intended usage.
>> 
>> Alright, got a second opinion on this from someone better at security
>> than me; I'll go try out some different ideas :)
>
> It is a general security concern for me that BPF test_run gets access to
> memory used by 'system page pool', with the concern of leaking data
> (from real traffic) to an attacker than can inject a BPF test_run
> program via e.g. a CI pipeline.
>
> I'm not saying we leaking data today in BPF/XDP progs, but there is a
> potential, because to gain performance in XDP and page_pool we don't
> clear memory to avoid cache line performance issues.
> I guess today, I could BPF tail extend and read packet data from older
> frames, in this way, if I get access to 'system page pool'.

I agree that the leak concern is non-trivial (also of the secret cookie
value), so I am not planning to re-submit with that approach. I got
half-way revising the patches to use the system PP but always
re-initialise the pages before the merge window. This comes with a ~7%
overhead on small packets and probably more with big frames (due to the
memcpy() of the payload data).

Due to this, my current plan is to take a hybrid approach, depending on
the 'repetitions' parameter: for low repetition counts, just
pre-allocate a bunch of pages from the system PP at setup time,
initialise them, and don't bother with recycling. And for large
repetition counts, keep the current approach of allocating a separate PP
for each syscall invocation. The threshold for when something is a "low"
number is the kicker here, of course, but probably some static value can
be set as a threshold; I'll play around with this and see what makes
sense.

WDYT about this?

-Toke


  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-04 13:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-20 21:03 [PATCH net-next v2 0/4] Change BPF_TEST_RUN use the system page pool for live XDP frames Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-02-20 21:03 ` [PATCH net-next v2 1/4] net: Register system page pool as an XDP memory model Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-04-03 20:20   ` John Fastabend
2024-04-04  9:08     ` Alexander Lobakin
2024-02-20 21:03 ` [PATCH net-next v2 2/4] bpf: test_run: Use system page pool for XDP live frame mode Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-02-21 14:48   ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-04-04 11:23     ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2024-04-04 13:34       ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen [this message]
2024-04-03 16:34   ` Alexander Lobakin
2024-04-03 20:39     ` John Fastabend
2024-04-04 11:43       ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2024-04-04 13:09         ` Alexander Lobakin
2024-02-20 21:03 ` [PATCH net-next v2 3/4] bpf: test_run: Fix cacheline alignment of live XDP frame data structures Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-02-20 21:03 ` [PATCH net-next v2 4/4] page pool: Remove init_callback parameter Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2024-02-29 18:12   ` Ilias Apalodimas
2024-02-21 14:45 ` [PATCH net-next v2 0/4] Change BPF_TEST_RUN use the system page pool for live XDP frames Toke Høiland-Jørgensen

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