From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4427CCD1BC for ; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 12:25:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1vBuM6-0000OC-5V; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 08:23:46 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1vBuKl-0006HR-7s for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 08:22:26 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com ([170.10.133.124]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1vBuKi-00078D-Vy for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 08:22:22 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1761222137; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=mk5vgdbh4MDG5vNhptvyHwPADCxvqiRpCMsJ0wLXFUo=; b=DsW6/xIO5GadOCYEP7ZOFqCrdCV4okqL8SkGvoKy9qjg7EHkut/hgH+7YyQk1eMaYwaFzG VrgWKCwOoVQE9LbCfWTGkcYr3lXydyYVua2dnvzMjAOTGuXb061rIRCEPE1A/l9AvH4Z+k Pje1Kg33i2peCRfG6WQmqJ2lu/UOguA= Received: from mx-prod-mc-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-35-165-154-97.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [35.165.154.97]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-106-IFu7DfVUO0iIhDcm6-SX-Q-1; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 08:22:16 -0400 X-MC-Unique: IFu7DfVUO0iIhDcm6-SX-Q-1 X-Mimecast-MFC-AGG-ID: IFu7DfVUO0iIhDcm6-SX-Q_1761222135 Received: from mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.12]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-08.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1C77F1800345; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 12:22:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: from blackfin.pond.sub.org (unknown [10.45.242.19]) by mx-prod-int-03.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C542719560B5; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 12:22:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: by blackfin.pond.sub.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 29D6721E6A27; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 14:22:12 +0200 (CEST) From: Markus Armbruster To: Daniel P. =?utf-8?Q?Berrang=C3=A9?= Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Thomas Huth , Stefan Hajnoczi , Philippe =?utf-8?Q?Mathieu-Daud=C3=A9?= , Peter Maydell , Paolo Bonzini , "Michael S. Tsirkin" Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 12/32] docs: expand security docs with info about security status In-Reply-To: <20250926140144.1998694-13-berrange@redhat.com> ("Daniel P. =?utf-8?Q?Berrang=C3=A9=22's?= message of "Fri, 26 Sep 2025 15:01:23 +0100") References: <20250926140144.1998694-1-berrange@redhat.com> <20250926140144.1998694-13-berrange@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 14:22:12 +0200 Message-ID: <87tszp6c5n.fsf@pond.sub.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.0 on 10.30.177.12 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.133.124; envelope-from=armbru@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -20 X-Spam_score: -2.1 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.001, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_SAFE_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 writes: > The description of virtualization vs non-virtualization use > cases is a crude approximation of the security characteristics > of QEMU devices. > > Document how QEMU can be probed to obtain information on the > security status of type classes, and how policies can be set > to inform or control their usage. > > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 > --- > docs/system/security.rst | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/docs/system/security.rst b/docs/system/security.rst > index f2092c8768..cda4bae6db 100644 > --- a/docs/system/security.rst > +++ b/docs/system/security.rst > @@ -49,6 +49,49 @@ Bugs affecting the non-virtualization use case are not= considered security > bugs at this time. Users with non-virtualization use cases must not rel= y on > QEMU to provide guest isolation or any security guarantees. >=20=20 > +Security status reporting > +''''''''''''''''''''''''' > + > +QEMU is progressively working to annotate object types to explicitly sta= te Suggest "The QEMU project is working" > +whether they are considered to provide a security boundary or not. > + > +It is possible to control or identify the usage of types that do not off= er > +an explicit security boundary using the ``insecure-types`` parameter to = the > +``-compat`` argument, which accepts three values: > + > + * accept: usage of any type will be permitted. This is the current > + and historical default behaviour > + * warn: usage of types not explicitly declared secure will result > + in a warning message, but still be permitted. > + * reject: usage of types not explicitly declared secure will result > + in an error message, and will not be permitted. > + > +The compatibility policy will be honoured both at initial startup of > +QEMU and during any runtime alterations made with monitor commands. This is about QOM. It doesn't cover security boundaries outside QOM, e.g. in block backends. I think we better make this limitation quite clear here. > + > +The status of any type class can be queried at runtime using the > +``qom-list-types`` command, whose returned information will flag any > +types declared as secure. The ``query-machines`` command will also > +reflect this same information for machine types. > + > +Machine type, accelerator and device security status can be queried > +using ``-machine help``, ``-accel help`` and ``-device help`` command > +line options respectively. > + > +The setting of the ``.secure`` field at the time a type class is > +declared in the code will determine whether bugs are eligible to > +be considered as security bugs: > + > + * Explicitly declared ``.secure =3D true``: security bug process > + applies, eligible for CVE assignment > + * Explicitly declared ``.secure =3D false``: security bug process > + does not apply, ineligible for CVE assignment > + * No declaration of ``.secure`` property: follow the security > + bug process initially. The virtualization vs non-virtualization > + use case classification will be evaluated during bug triage > + to determine whether to continue the security bug process, > + or switch to the regular bug process. Should this evaluation result in a declaration of .secure? > + > Architecture > ------------