From: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@gmail.com>
To: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
"Nick Desaulniers" <nick.desaulniers+lkml@gmail.com>,
"Bill Wendling" <morbo@google.com>,
"Justin Stitt" <justinstitt@google.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
llvm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/4] landlock: implement memfd detection
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2025 15:56:38 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87v7nj7p1d.fsf@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKtyLkEJKLgO1GvpTNmW=DnRhrsiPXGgz9=F7oJXVQPLSocSeA@mail.gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3365 bytes --]
Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org> writes:
> On Sat, Jul 19, 2025 at 4:13 AM Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Add is_memfd_file() function to reliably detect memfd files by checking
>> for “memfd:” prefix in dentry names on shmem-backed files. This
>> distinguishes true memfd files from regular shmem files.
>>
>> Move domain_is_scoped() to domain.c for reuse across subsystems.
>> Add comprehensive kunit tests for memfd detection edge cases.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Abhinav Saxena <xandfury@gmail.com>
>> —
>> security/landlock/domain.c | 67 +++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/domain.h | 4 +
>> security/landlock/fs.c | 210 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/task.c | 67 —————
>> 4 files changed, 281 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
>
> …
>
>>
>> +/**
>> + * is_memfd_file - Check if file was created via memfd_create()
>> + * @file: File to check
>> + *
>> + * Returns true if @file was created via memfd_create(), false otherwise.
>> + *
>> + * memfd files are shmem-backed files with “memfd:” prefix in their dentry name.
>> + * This is the definitive way to distinguish memfd files from regular shmem
>> + * files.
>> + */
>> +static bool is_memfd_file(struct file *file)
>> +{
>> + const struct dentry *dentry;
>> + const unsigned char *name;
>> + size_t name_len;
>> +
>> + /* Fast path: basic validation */
>> + if (unlikely(!file))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + /* Must be shmem-backed first - this is the cheapest definitive check */
>> + if (!shmem_file(file))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE
>> +
>> + /* Validate dentry and get name info */
>> + dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
>> + if (unlikely(!dentry))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + name_len = dentry->d_name.len;
>> + name = dentry->d_name.name;
>> +
>> + /* memfd files always have “memfd:” prefix (6 characters) */
>> + if (name_len < 6 || unlikely(!name))
>> + return false;
>> +
>> + /* Check for exact “memfd:” prefix */
>> + return memcmp(name, “memfd:”, 6) == 0;
>> +#else
>> + return false;
>> +#endif
>
> I was trying to do something similar early this year but didn’t hear
> feedback from the linux-mm folks.
> <https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20250129203932.22165-1-wufan@kernel.org/>
>
> I have considered this approach but didn’t use it. My concern is,
> potentially a malicious user can create a file in a shmem fs, e.g.
> tmpfs , with the “memfd:” prefix, which can be used to bypass security
> policy.
> (Resending this message due to a misconfiguration with my email
> client. Apologies for any inconvenience.)
>
> -Fan
Hi Fan,
Thanks for your comments.
I agree that an LSM hook into memfd_create() would be a much better
solution. In the absence of such a function, do you think adding a
`d_unlinked(dentry)` check could serve as an additional verification?
I say things since I *think* that legitimate memfd files are always
unlinked while spoofed tmpfs files remain linked. I could be wrong
though.
In any case, we can test this approach using kprobes to validate
the behavior.
-Abhinav
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-23 0:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-19 11:13 [PATCH RFC 0/4] landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC execution Abhinav Saxena
2025-07-19 11:13 ` [PATCH RFC 1/4] landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC scope Abhinav Saxena
2025-07-19 11:13 ` [PATCH RFC 2/4] landlock: implement memfd detection Abhinav Saxena
2025-07-19 15:51 ` kernel test robot
2025-07-20 7:32 ` Fan Wu
2025-07-22 21:56 ` Abhinav Saxena [this message]
2025-09-18 14:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-18 14:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-07-19 11:13 ` [PATCH RFC 3/4] landlock: add memfd exec LSM hooks and scoping Abhinav Saxena
2025-07-19 11:13 ` [PATCH RFC 4/4] selftests/landlock: add memfd execution tests Abhinav Saxena
2025-09-18 14:07 ` [PATCH RFC 0/4] landlock: add LANDLOCK_SCOPE_MEMFD_EXEC execution Mickaël Salaün
2025-09-28 23:37 ` Abhinav Saxena
2025-11-20 15:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
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