From: "Toke Høiland-Jørgensen" <toke@redhat.com>
To: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
pabeni@redhat.com, horms@kernel.org, jiri@resnulli.us,
victor@mojatatu.com, david.laight.linux@gmail.com,
yimingqian591@gmail.com, keenanat2000@gmail.com,
2045gemini@gmail.com, rollkingzzc@gmail.com, dcaratti@redhat.com,
security@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>,
Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2 1/1] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption
Date: Tue, 26 May 2026 21:22:52 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wlwq2cxf.fsf@toke.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260526155913.1060694-1-jhs@mojatatu.com>
Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com> writes:
> From: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
>
> tcf_pedit_act() computes the COW range for skb_ensure_writable()
> once before the key loop using tcfp_off_max_hint, but the hint does
> not account for the runtime header offset added by typed keys. This
> can leave part of the write region un-COW'd.
>
> Fix by moving skb_ensure_writable() inside the per-key loop where
> the actual write offset is known, and add overflow checking on the
> offset arithmetic. For negative offsets (e.g. Ethernet header edits
> at ingress), use skb_cow() to COW the headroom instead. Guard
> offset_valid() against INT_MIN, where negation is undefined.
>
> Additionally, linearize skbs with shared frags upfront to prevent
> silent data corruption when pedit operates on zero-copy pages
> (e.g. from sendfile).
>
> Fixes: 8b796475fd78 ("net/sched: act_pedit: really ensure the skb is writable")
> Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
> Reported-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
> Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
> Signed-off-by: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
Re-ran the tests, and everything looks good, so:
Tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Also looked at the code, and I have a few nits below, but I'm really
nitpicking here, so whether you end up fixing those or not:
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
[...]
> @@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
> if (offset > 0 && offset > skb->len)
> return false;
>
> - if (offset < 0 && -offset > skb_headroom(skb))
> + if (offset < 0 && offset < -(int)skb_headroom(skb))
> return false;
This change makes it really obvious that this is really just:
if (offset < -(int)skb_headroom(skb))
return false;
so, well, that would be clearer, IMO.
But then I guess the same could be said of the positive case, so:
static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
{
if (offset > skb->len || offset < -(int)skb_headroom(skb))
return false;
return true;
}
> @@ -393,18 +394,10 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex;
> struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
> struct tc_pedit_key *tkey;
> - u32 max_offset;
> int i;
>
> parms = rcu_dereference_bh(p->parms);
>
> - max_offset = (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) ?
> - skb_transport_offset(skb) :
> - skb_network_offset(skb)) +
> - parms->tcfp_off_max_hint;
> - if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min(skb->len, max_offset)))
> - goto done;
> -
> tcf_lastuse_update(&p->tcf_tm);
> tcf_action_update_bstats(&p->common, skb);
>
> @@ -412,9 +405,10 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
> tkey_ex = parms->tcfp_keys_ex;
>
> for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
> + int write_offset, write_len;
> int offset = tkey->off;
> int hoffset = 0;
> - u32 *ptr, hdata;
> + u32 *ptr;
> u32 val;
> int rc;
>
> @@ -451,15 +445,38 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
> }
> }
>
> - if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
> - pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n", hoffset + offset);
> + if (unlikely(check_add_overflow(hoffset, offset,
It's a bit weird that this has the unlikely(), but the offset_valid()
check doesn't?
> + &write_offset))) {
> + pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset overflow\n");
> goto bad;
> }
>
> - ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + offset,
> - sizeof(hdata), &hdata);
> - if (!ptr)
> + if (!offset_valid(skb, write_offset)) {
> + pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
> + write_offset);
> goto bad;
> + }
> +
> + if (write_offset < 0) {
> + if (skb_cow(skb, -write_offset))
> + goto bad;
> + if (write_offset + (int)sizeof(*ptr) > 0) {
> + if (skb_ensure_writable(skb,
> + min(skb->len,
> + write_offset + sizeof(*ptr))))
Combining these with && instead of the double indentation would be more
readable IMO (shorter lines, aligning the 'goto bad' labels).
> + goto bad;
> + }
> + } else {
> + if (unlikely(check_add_overflow(write_offset,
> + (int)sizeof(*ptr),
> + &write_len)))
Same comment wrt unlikely()
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-26 19:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-26 15:59 [PATCH net v2 1/1] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-26 19:22 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen [this message]
2026-05-27 9:00 ` David Laight
2026-05-27 10:21 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2026-05-27 14:56 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-27 15:12 ` Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
2026-05-27 16:44 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-27 16:13 ` David Laight
2026-05-27 16:48 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-27 18:25 ` Jamal Hadi Salim
2026-05-26 21:29 ` Davide Caratti
2026-05-27 2:36 ` Han Guidong
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