From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, keescook@chromium.org,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, willy@infradead.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, shuah@kernel.org,
kernel@collabora.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag
Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2020 00:59:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wo14n9ru.fsf@collabora.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200907101608.ldfhhvcy3vmrkg6b@wittgenstein> (Christian Brauner's message of "Mon, 7 Sep 2020 12:16:08 +0200")
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> writes:
> On Fri, Sep 04, 2020 at 04:31:39PM -0400, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote:
>> index afe01e232935..3511c98a7849 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
>> @@ -959,7 +959,11 @@ struct task_struct {
>> kuid_t loginuid;
>> unsigned int sessionid;
>> #endif
>> - struct seccomp seccomp;
>> +
>> + struct {
>> + unsigned int syscall_intercept;
>> + struct seccomp seccomp;
>> + };
>
> If there's no specific reason to do this I'd not wrap this in an
> anonymous struct. It doesn't really buy anything and there doesn't seem
> to be precedent in struct task_struct right now. Also, if this somehow
> adds padding it seems you might end up increasing the size of struct
> task_struct more than necessary by accident? (I might be wrong
> though.)
Hi Christian,
Thanks for your review on this and on the other patches of this series.
I wrapped these to prevent struct layout randomization from separating
the flags field from seccomp, as they are going to be used together and
I was trying to reduce overhead to seccomp entry due to two cache misses
when reading this structure. Measuring it seccomp_benchmark didn't show
any difference with the unwrapped version, so perhaps it was a bit of
premature optimization?
>> diff --git a/include/linux/syscall_intercept.h b/include/linux/syscall_intercept.h
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..725d157699da
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/include/linux/syscall_intercept.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
>> +/*
>> + * Copyright (C) 2020 Collabora Ltd.
>> + */
>> +#ifndef _SYSCALL_INTERCEPT_H
>> +#define _SYSCALL_INTERCEPT_H
>> +
>> +#include <linux/sched.h>
>> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
>> +#include <linux/thread_info.h>
>> +
>> +#define SYSINT_SECCOMP 0x1
>
> <bikeshed>
>
> Can we maybe use a better name for this? I noone minds the extra
> characters I'd suggest:
> SYSCALL_INTERCEPT_SECCOMP
> or
> SYS_INTERCEPT_SECCOMP
>
> </bikeshed>
>
will do.
Thanks,
--
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-08 4:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-04 20:31 [PATCH v6 0/9] Syscall User Dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 1/9] kernel: Support TIF_SYSCALL_INTERCEPT flag Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:16 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-08 4:59 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi [this message]
2020-09-22 19:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 20:28 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-11 9:32 ` peterz
2020-09-11 20:08 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-24 11:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-09-22 19:44 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 20:18 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-23 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-25 8:00 ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-09-25 16:15 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-25 20:30 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 2/9] kernel: entry: Support TIF_SYSCAL_INTERCEPT on common entry code Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:16 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-11 9:35 ` peterz
2020-09-11 20:11 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 3/9] x86: vdso: Expose sigreturn address on vdso to the kernel Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:40 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 4/9] signal: Expose SYS_USER_DISPATCH si_code type Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:15 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-22 19:39 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 5/9] kernel: Implement selective syscall userspace redirection Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-05 11:24 ` Matthew Wilcox
2020-09-11 9:44 ` peterz
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 6/9] kernel: entry: Support Syscall User Dispatch for common syscall entry Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-07 10:15 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-07 14:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-07 14:25 ` Christian Brauner
2020-09-07 20:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-11 9:46 ` peterz
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 7/9] x86: Enable Syscall User Dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:37 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-23 20:23 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 8/9] selftests: Add kselftest for syscall user dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-04 20:31 ` [PATCH v6 9/9] doc: Document Syscall User Dispatch Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2020-09-22 19:35 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=87wo14n9ru.fsf@collabora.com \
--to=krisman@collabora.com \
--cc=christian.brauner@ubuntu.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kernel@collabora.com \
--cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=willy@infradead.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.