From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, "Reshetova\,
Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] mm: extend memfd with ability to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2020 21:01:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y2m1qlj6.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrUwO_y_b=kazRjen-de50r9b9TVXUXz_WT_hD3d3tTWxQ@mail.gmail.com> (Andy Lutomirski's message of "Wed, 26 Aug 2020 09:54:57 -0700")
* Andy Lutomirski:
>> I _believe_ there are also things like AES-NI that can get strong
>> protection from stuff like this. They load encryption keys into (AVX)
>> registers and then can do encrypt/decrypt operations without the keys
>> leaving the registers. If the key was loaded from a secret memory area
>> right into the registers, I think the protection from cache attacks
>> would be pretty strong.
>
> Except for context switches :)
An rseq sequence could request that the AVX registers should be
cleared on context switch. (I'm mostly kidding.)
I think the main issue is that we do not have a good established
programming model to actually use such features and completely avoid
making copies of secret data.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-26 19:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-30 16:23 [RFC PATCH] mm: extend memfd with ability to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-01-30 16:23 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-02-06 18:51 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <df5a888b-1a11-e806-741d-94684b22c966-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2020-02-08 17:39 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-02-08 17:39 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-02-10 8:06 ` Reshetova, Elena
2020-02-10 8:06 ` Reshetova, Elena
2020-02-11 19:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-02-11 19:52 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2020-02-12 21:10 ` Jonathan Corbet
2020-02-16 6:46 ` Mike Rapoport
2020-08-14 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-14 18:09 ` Dave Hansen
2020-08-26 16:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-26 19:01 ` Florian Weimer [this message]
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