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From: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
To: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
Cc: buildroot@buildroot.org
Subject: Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/util-linux: security bump to 2.41.5
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2026 21:38:46 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87zf0rd4ft.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260618075411.969878-1-giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com> (Giulio Benetti's message of "Thu, 18 Jun 2026 09:54:11 +0200")

>>>>> "Giulio" == Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com> writes:

 > Security fixes:
 >  CVE-2026-53613 - mount(8) TOCTOU race on target path.
 >    The SUID mount does not pin the mount target directory, allowing a
 >    race between path resolution and the actual mount syscall.  A local
 >    attacker can swap an ancestor directory component between these
 >    steps to redirect a mount to an arbitrary location.
 >    Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 >  CVE-2026-53612 - mount(8) TOCTOU race on post-mount owner/mode change.
 >    The X-mount.owner, X-mount.group, and X-mount.mode options use
 >    path-based lchown()/chmod() after mounting.  An attacker can swap
 >    the target between mount and the ownership/mode change to gain
 >    control of arbitrary files.
 >    Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 >  CVE-2026-53614 - mount(8) SUID bypass via LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2.
 >    The environment variable LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 is not filtered
 >    via safe_getenv() in SUID context.  A local attacker can force
 >    the legacy mount(2) code path, which uses a two-step bind+remount
 >    or propagation sequence with a window where security flags (nosuid,
 >    noexec, ...) are not yet applied.
 >    Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 > Full release notes: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.41/v2.41.5-ReleaseNotes

 > Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>

Committed, thanks.

-- 
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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      reply	other threads:[~2026-06-18 19:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-18  7:54 [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/util-linux: security bump to 2.41.5 Giulio Benetti
2026-06-18 19:38 ` Peter Korsgaard [this message]

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