From: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs()
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 10:37:16 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87zhefsugj.fsf@vitty.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200122054724.GD18513@linux.intel.com>
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> writes:
> On Sat, Jan 18, 2020 at 10:42:31PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> IMHO the features should stay available in case the guest chooses not to
>> use eVMCS. A guest that uses eVMCS should know which features it cannot
>> use and not enable them.
>
> Makes sense, wasn't thinking about the scenario where the guest doesn't
> support eVMCS or doesn't want to use it for whatever reason.
>
> Rather than update vmx->nested.msrs or filter vmx_get_msr(), what about
> manually adding eVMCS consistency checks on the disallowed bits and handle
> SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES as a one-off case by simply
> clearing it from the eVMCS?
Unfortunately, this doesn't work because ... Windows. Not only Hyper-V
enables SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES, it actually expects it
to work (somehow) so when I do
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
index 72359709cdc1..e6c30eec2817 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/evmcs.c
@@ -361,11 +361,5 @@ int nested_enable_evmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
if (evmcs_already_enabled)
return 0;
- vmx->nested.msrs.pinbased_ctls_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_PINCTRL;
- vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMENTRY_CTRL;
- vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMEXIT_CTRL;
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_2NDEXEC;
- vmx->nested.msrs.vmfunc_controls &= ~EVMCS1_UNSUPPORTED_VMFUNC;
-
return 0;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index bb8afe0c5e7f..cd1f5a1c884b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -1590,7 +1590,7 @@ static int copy_enlightened_to_vmcs12(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
evmcs->pin_based_vm_exec_control;
vmcs12->vm_exit_controls = evmcs->vm_exit_controls;
vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control =
- evmcs->secondary_vm_exec_control;
+ evmcs->secondary_vm_exec_control & ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
}
if (unlikely(!(evmcs->hv_clean_fields &
Hyper-V 2016 with > 1 vCPU fails to boot :-(
--
Vitaly
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-01-22 9:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-01-15 17:10 [PATCH RFC 0/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: fix enlightened VMCS & QEMU4.2 Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 17:10 ` [PATCH RFC 1/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: remove stale evmcs_already_enabled check from nested_enable_evmcs() Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 22:50 ` Liran Alon
2020-01-15 17:10 ` [PATCH RFC 2/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: move VMX controls sanitization out of nested_enable_evmcs() Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 22:49 ` Liran Alon
2020-01-16 8:37 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-02-03 15:11 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 23:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-15 23:30 ` Liran Alon
2020-01-16 8:51 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-16 16:19 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-16 16:57 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-17 6:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-18 21:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-19 8:54 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-22 5:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-22 9:37 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov [this message]
2020-01-22 14:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-22 15:08 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-22 15:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-22 16:29 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-22 16:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-23 9:15 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-23 19:09 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-24 17:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-27 15:38 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-27 17:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-01-27 21:52 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-27 18:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-15 17:10 ` [PATCH RFC 3/3] x86/kvm/hyper-v: don't allow to turn on unsupported VMX controls for nested guests Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-15 22:59 ` Liran Alon
2020-01-16 8:55 ` Vitaly Kuznetsov
2020-01-16 16:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-01-19 8:57 ` Paolo Bonzini
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