From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) Subject: Re: [PATCH] fuse: Only allow read/writing user xattrs Date: Sat, 06 Oct 2012 16:42:05 -0700 Message-ID: <87zk3zgoc2.fsf@xmission.com> References: <87boggpm7r.fsf@xmission.com> <87a9vzlimm.fsf@xmission.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Cc: Miklos Szeredi , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: Eric Paris Return-path: In-Reply-To: (Eric Paris's message of "Sat, 6 Oct 2012 11:57:35 -0400") Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org Eric Paris writes: > Why trust uids or rwx bits. Might as well do away with those as well, > right? Lying to your own userspace processes (which you can do with LD_PRELOAD) is rather different than lying to the selinux or the smack modules. What I am saying with my patch is that fuse is remarkably non-nuanced in how it interacts with extended attributes, and that it appears very clear that there are bugs in the area of unprivileged mounts that need to be addressed. I am happy to hear about better solutions. Telling me it's not a bug and sticking your head in the sand is quite amusing. Eric