From: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, David Vernet <void@manifault.com>,
Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>,
Changwoo Min <changwoo@igalia.com>,
Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
sched-ext@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: sched_ext: Mark ops argument container pointer fields as trusted
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 19:20:21 -1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <95d7ccc17681aa3a4a2eeb1b073f00f7@kernel.org> (raw)
Walking an unannotated pointer field of a trusted struct yields a bare
PTR_TO_BTF_ID in non-sleepable programs, which kfuncs and helpers accept,
but PTR_UNTRUSTED in sleepable programs, which they reject. This gets in the
way of making ops.init_task() sleepable, which schedulers want for
allocations. For example, passing args->cgroup into bpf_cgrp_storage_get()
then fails verification and the only recourse is round-tripping through the
cgroup ID with bpf_cgroup_from_id().
The pointer fields in the sched_ext ops argument containers are all pinned
by the callers for the duration of the ops calls and are never NULL. Add
them to the verifier's trusted-fields whitelist so that they are PTR_TRUSTED
in both sleepable and non-sleepable programs.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5661,6 +5661,28 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file) {
struct inode *f_inode;
};
+/*
+ * The pointer fields in the sched_ext ops argument containers are pinned by the
+ * callers for the duration of the ops calls and are never NULL.
+ */
+BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_init_task_args) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_EXT_GROUP_SCHED
+ struct cgroup *cgroup;
+#endif
+};
+
+BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_cpu_release_args) {
+ struct task_struct *task;
+};
+
+BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_sub_attach_args) {
+ struct sched_ext_ops *ops;
+};
+
+BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_sub_detach_args) {
+ struct sched_ext_ops *ops;
+};
+
BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry) {
struct inode *d_inode;
};
@@ -5705,6 +5727,10 @@ static bool type_is_trusted(struct bpf_v
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct bpf_iter__task));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct linux_binprm));
BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct file));
+ BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_init_task_args));
+ BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_cpu_release_args));
+ BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_sub_attach_args));
+ BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED(struct scx_sub_detach_args));
return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id, "__safe_trusted");
}
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-20 5:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-20 5:20 Tejun Heo [this message]
2026-08-20 6:16 ` [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: sched_ext: Mark ops argument container pointer fields as trusted bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-20 8:11 ` Tejun Heo
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