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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4.1 09/14] x86/pv: Adjust GS handling for FRED mode
Date: Thu, 5 Mar 2026 11:00:26 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9e873ced-59cd-4e5a-91d9-375e7cb2798b@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260304171826.45847-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

On 04.03.2026 18:18, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> When FRED is active, hardware automatically swaps GS when changing privilege,
> and the SWAPGS instruction is disallowed.
> 
> For native OSes using GS as the thread local pointer this is a massive
> improvement on the pre-FRED architecture, but under Xen it makes handling PV
> guests more complicated.  Specifically, it means that GS_BASE and GS_SHADOW
> are the opposite way around in FRED mode, as opposed to IDT mode.
> 
> This leads to the following changes:
> 
>   * In load_segments(), we already load both GSes.  Account for FRED in the
>     SWAP() condition and avoid the path with SWAGS.
> 
>   * In save_segments(), we need to read GS_SHADOW rather than GS_BASE.
> 
>   * In toggle_guest_mode(), we need to emulate SWAPGS.
> 
>   * In {read,write}_msr() which access the live registers, GS_SHADOW and
>     GS_BASE need swapping.
> 
>   * In do_set_segment_base(), merge the SEGBASE_GS_{USER,KERNEL} cases and
>     take FRED into account when choosing which base to update.
> 
>     SEGBASE_GS_USER_SEL was already an LKGS invocation (decades before FRED)
>     so under FRED needs to be just a MOV %gs.  Simply skip the SWAPGSes.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> ---
> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
> 
> v4.1:
>  * Extra comments

Thanks.

Jan


  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-05 10:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-27 23:16 [PATCH v4 00/14] x86: FRED support Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] x86/pv: Don't assume that INT $imm8 instructions are two bytes long Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 11:03   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 11:43     ` Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 12:57       ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 16:39         ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] docs/guest-guide: Describe the PV traps and entrypoints ABI Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 11:19   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 14:47     ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] x86/boot: Move gdt_l1e caching out of traps_init() Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 11:33   ` Jan Beulich
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] x86/boot: Document the ordering dependency of _svm_cpu_up() Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 11:35   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 15:20   ` Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 15:34     ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 15:42       ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] x86/traps: Move traps_init() earlier on boot Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 11:39   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 15:32     ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86/traps: Don't configure Supervisor Shadow Stack tokens in FRED mode Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 14:50   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 15:47     ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86/traps: Introduce FRED entrypoints Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86/traps: Enable FRED when requested Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 16:12   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-03 13:44     ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86/pv: Adjust GS handling for FRED mode Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 16:24   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-04 17:18   ` [PATCH v4.1 " Andrew Cooper
2026-03-05 10:00     ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86/pv: Guest exception handling in " Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] x86/pv: ERETU error handling Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] x86/pv: System call handling in FRED mode Andrew Cooper
2026-03-09 22:25   ` Andrew Cooper
2026-03-10  7:16     ` Jan Beulich
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86: Clamp reserved bits in eflags more aggressively Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 16:35   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-11 17:58   ` [PATCH v4.1 13/14] x86: Clamp " Andrew Cooper
2026-03-12  8:15     ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-12 12:36       ` Andrew Cooper
2026-02-27 23:16 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] x86/traps: Use fatal_trap() for #UD and #GP Andrew Cooper
2026-03-02 16:39   ` Jan Beulich
2026-03-02 16:40   ` Jan Beulich

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