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From: Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>
To: "George S. Coker, II" <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil>,
	Derek Murray <Derek.Murray@cl.cam.ac.uk>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>,
	xense-devel@lists.xensource.com
Subject: Re: [Xense-devel][PATCH][1/4] Xen Security Modules: XSM
Date: Fri, 11 May 2007 17:51:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <C26A5DA4.EC67%keir@xensource.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1178896208.6520.171.camel@moss-walleye.epoch.ncsc.mil>




On 11/5/07 16:10, "George S. Coker, II" <gscoker@alpha.ncsc.mil> wrote:

>> The untidiest cases are where set_foreigndom() is involved. These
>> involve do_mmu_update(), do_update_va_otherdomain() and some
>> mmuext_ops. In particular, on the do_update_va_otherdomain() path,
>> IS_PRIV is checked twice. It would seem to me that the cleanest way
>> to do this is to have the permission check first (can domain X access
>> MFN Y of domain Z?), then carry out the set_foreigndom() logic.
>> 
> 
> I think I agree.

In this case you theoretically race reuse of the domid, don't you? Actually
you are saved by the RCU mechanism, but why is doing the check after
set_foreigndom() hard? The error path out of e.g., do_mmu_update() will
correctly give up the foreign reference.

 -- Keir

  reply	other threads:[~2007-05-11 16:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-05-07 21:41 [Xense-devel][PATCH][1/4] Xen Security Modules: XSM George S. Coker, II
2007-05-07 23:10 ` Chris Wright
2007-05-08  0:59   ` George S. Coker, II
2007-05-08  1:12     ` George S. Coker, II
2007-05-08  3:08     ` Chris Wright
2007-05-08  2:54 ` Mark Williamson
2007-05-08 12:44   ` John McDermott (US Navy Employee)
2007-05-08 13:12     ` Mark Williamson
2007-05-09 14:04 ` Derek Murray
2007-05-09 14:23   ` Keir Fraser
2007-05-09 17:04     ` George S. Coker, II
2007-05-11 13:32       ` Derek Murray
2007-05-11 15:10         ` George S. Coker, II
2007-05-11 16:51           ` Keir Fraser [this message]
2007-05-11 17:19             ` George S. Coker, II
2007-05-18  3:56           ` Stefan Berger
2007-05-18 20:00             ` George S. Coker, II
2007-05-09 17:13   ` George S. Coker, II
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2007-06-04 19:06 George S. Coker, II

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