From: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
To: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>, xen-devel@lists.xen.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] Merge IS_PRIV checks into XSM hooks
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2012 21:51:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CC741177.4B381%keir@xen.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1347306553-20980-1-git-send-email-dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
On 10/09/2012 20:48, "Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote:
> Overall, this series should not change the behavior of Xen when XSM is
> not enabled; however, in some cases, the exact errors that are returned
> will be different because security checks have been moved below validity
> checks. Also, once applied, newly introduced domctls and sysctls will
> not automatically be guarded by IS_PRIV checks - they will need to add
> their own permission checking code.
How do we guard against accidentally forgetting to do this?
> The ARM architecture is not touched at all in these patches. The only
> obvious breakage that I can see is due to rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id
> being removed, but XSM hooks will be needed for domctls and sysctls.
So ARM build is broken? And/or ARM is made insecure because of unchecked
sysctls/domctls?
-- Keir
> The rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id and rcu_lock_remote_target_domain_by_id
> functions are removed by this series because they act as wrappers around
> IS_PRIV_FOR; their callers have been changed to use XSM checks instead.
>
> Miscellaneous updates to FLASK:
> [PATCH 01/20] xsm/flask: remove inherited class attributes
> [PATCH 02/20] xsm/flask: remove unneeded create_sid field
> [PATCH 03/20] xen: Add versions of rcu_lock_*_domain without IS_PRIV
> [PATCH 04/20] xsm/flask: add domain relabel support
> [PATCH 05/20] libxl: introduce XSM relabel on build
> [PATCH 06/20] flask/policy: Add domain relabel example
>
> Preparatory new hooks:
> [PATCH 07/20] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap
> [PATCH 08/20] arch/x86: add missing XSM checks to XENPF_ commands
> [PATCH 09/20] xsm/flask: Add checks on the domain performing the
>
> Refactoring:
> [PATCH 10/20] xsm: Add IS_PRIV checks to dummy XSM module
> [PATCH 11/20] xen: use XSM instead of IS_PRIV where duplicated
> [PATCH 12/20] xen: avoid calling rcu_lock_*target_domain when an XSM
>
> Remaining IS_PRIV calls:
> [PATCH 13/20] arch/x86: Add missing domctl and mem_sharing XSM hooks
> [PATCH 14/20] tmem: Add access control check
> [PATCH 17/20] arch/x86: use XSM hooks for get_pg_owner access checks
> [PATCH 18/20] xen: Add XSM hook for XENMEM_exchange
>
> Cleanup, FLASK updates to support IS_PRIV emulation:
> [PATCH 15/20] xsm: remove unneeded xsm_call macro
> [PATCH 16/20] xsm/flask: add distinct SIDs for self/target access
> [PATCH 19/20] xen: remove rcu_lock_{remote_,}target_domain_by_id
> [PATCH 20/20] flask: add missing operations
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-09-10 20:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-09-10 19:48 [PATCH v2] Merge IS_PRIV checks into XSM hooks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 01/20] xsm/flask: remove inherited class attributes Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 02/20] xsm/flask: remove unneeded create_sid field Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 03/20] xen: Add versions of rcu_lock_*_domain without IS_PRIV checks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 04/20] xsm/flask: add domain relabel support Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 05/20] libxl: introduce XSM relabel on build Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:48 ` [PATCH 06/20] flask/policy: Add domain relabel example Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 07/20] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 08/20] arch/x86: add missing XSM checks to XENPF_ commands Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 09/20] xsm/flask: Add checks on the domain performing the set_target operation Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 10/20] xsm: Add IS_PRIV checks to dummy XSM module Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 7:44 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-11 13:24 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 11/20] xen: use XSM instead of IS_PRIV where duplicated Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 7:29 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-11 9:05 ` Ian Campbell
2012-09-11 13:33 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 13:33 ` [PATCH] xen/console: Add domain ID to output if VERBOSE Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 14:23 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-11 14:26 ` Ian Campbell
2012-09-11 14:10 ` [PATCH 11/20] xen: use XSM instead of IS_PRIV where duplicated Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 12/20] xen: avoid calling rcu_lock_*target_domain when an XSM hook exists Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 7:36 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-11 13:26 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 14:15 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 13/20] arch/x86: Add missing domctl and mem_sharing XSM hooks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 14/20] tmem: Add access control check Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 7:40 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 15/20] xsm: remove unneeded xsm_call macro Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 16/20] xsm/flask: add distinct SIDs for self/target access Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 17/20] arch/x86: use XSM hooks for get_pg_owner access checks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 7:55 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-11 13:40 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 14:16 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-11 14:33 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 14:50 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 18/20] xen: Add XSM hook for XENMEM_exchange Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 19/20] xen: remove rcu_lock_{remote_, }target_domain_by_id Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 7:59 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-10 19:49 ` [PATCH 20/20] flask: add missing operations Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 20:51 ` Keir Fraser [this message]
2012-09-10 21:10 ` [PATCH v2] Merge IS_PRIV checks into XSM hooks Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 21:13 ` [PATCH 21/20] arch/arm: replace rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id with XSM Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-10 21:35 ` [PATCH v2] Merge IS_PRIV checks into XSM hooks Keir Fraser
2012-09-11 8:54 ` Ian Campbell
2012-09-11 13:49 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 8:09 ` Jan Beulich
2012-09-11 13:21 ` Daniel De Graaf
2012-09-11 14:11 ` Jan Beulich
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