Re: [PATCH v11 13/22] gpu: nova-core: Hopper/Blackwell: add FMC signature extraction

["Alexandre Courbot" <acourbot@nvidia.com>]

On Sat May 30, 2026 at 12:09 PM JST, John Hubbard wrote:
> Extract the SHA-384 hash, RSA public key, and RSA signature from the
> FMC ELF32 firmware sections. FSP Chain of Trust verification needs
> these to validate the FMC image during boot.
>
> Co-developed-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Courbot <acourbot@nvidia.com>
> Signed-off-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
> ---
>  drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware.rs     |  2 +-
>  drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware/fsp.rs | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware.rs b/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware.rs
> index 6edb50b83a29..569efee0d4ac 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware.rs
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware.rs
> @@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ fn elf32_section<'a>(elf: &'a [u8], name: &str) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
>      }
>  
>      /// Automatically detects ELF32 vs ELF64 based on the ELF header.
> -    pub(super) fn elf_section<'a>(elf: &'a [u8], name: &str) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
> +    pub(crate) fn elf_section<'a>(elf: &'a [u8], name: &str) -> Option<&'a [u8]> {
>          // Check ELF magic.
>          if elf.len() < 5 || elf.get(0..4)? != b"\x7fELF" {
>              return None;
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware/fsp.rs b/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware/fsp.rs
> index 011be1e571c2..dc28d0cc2d03 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware/fsp.rs
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/nova-core/firmware/fsp.rs
> @@ -15,13 +15,35 @@
>      gpu::Chipset, //
>  };
>  
> +/// Size of the FSP SHA-384 hash, in bytes.
> +pub(crate) const FSP_HASH_SIZE: usize = 48;
> +/// Maximum size of the FSP public key (RSA-3072), in bytes.
> +///
> +/// The FMC ELF `publickey` section may be shorter, so the remaining bytes are zero-padded.
> +pub(crate) const FSP_PKEY_SIZE: usize = 384;
> +/// Maximum size of the FSP signature (RSA-3072), in bytes.
> +///
> +/// The FMC ELF `signature` section may be shorter, so the remaining bytes are zero-padded.
> +pub(crate) const FSP_SIG_SIZE: usize = 384;
> +
> +/// Structure to hold FMC signatures.
> +///
> +/// C representation is used because this type is used for communication with the FSP.
> +#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
> +#[repr(C)]
> +pub(crate) struct FmcSignatures {
> +    pub(crate) hash384: [u8; FSP_HASH_SIZE],
> +    pub(crate) public_key: [u8; FSP_PKEY_SIZE],
> +    pub(crate) signature: [u8; FSP_SIG_SIZE],
> +}
> +
>  pub(crate) struct FspFirmware {
>      /// FMC firmware image data (only the "image" ELF section).
>      #[expect(dead_code)]
>      pub(crate) fmc_image: Coherent<[u8]>,
> -    /// Full FMC ELF for signature extraction.
> +    /// FMC firmware signatures.
>      #[expect(dead_code)]
> -    pub(crate) fmc_elf: Firmware,
> +    pub(crate) fmc_sigs: KBox<FmcSignatures>,
>  }
>  
>  impl FspFirmware {
> @@ -41,7 +63,69 @@ pub(crate) fn new(
>  
>          Ok(Self {
>              fmc_image,
> -            fmc_elf: fw,
> +            fmc_sigs: Self::extract_fmc_signatures(&fw, dev)?,
>          })
>      }
> +
> +    /// Extract FMC firmware signatures for Chain of Trust verification.
> +    ///
> +    /// Extracts real cryptographic signatures from FMC ELF32 firmware sections.
> +    /// Returns signatures in a heap-allocated structure to prevent stack overflow.
> +    fn extract_fmc_signatures(
> +        fmc_fw: &Firmware,
> +        dev: &device::Device,
> +    ) -> Result<KBox<FmcSignatures>> {
> +        let get_section = |name: &str, max_len: usize| {
> +            elf::elf_section(fmc_fw.data(), name)
> +                .ok_or(EINVAL)
> +                .inspect_err(|_| dev_err!(dev, "FMC firmware missing '{}' section\n", name))
> +                .and_then(|section| {
> +                    if section.len() > max_len {
> +                        dev_err!(
> +                            dev,
> +                            "FMC {} section size {} > maximum {}\n",
> +                            name,
> +                            section.len(),
> +                            max_len
> +                        );
> +                        Err(EINVAL)
> +                    } else {
> +                        Ok(section)
> +                    }
> +                })
> +        };
> +
> +        let hash_section = get_section("hash", FSP_HASH_SIZE)?;
> +        let pkey_section = get_section("publickey", FSP_PKEY_SIZE)?;
> +        let sig_section = get_section("signature", FSP_SIG_SIZE)?;
> +
> +        // The hash section is a SHA-384 output: it must be exactly FSP_HASH_SIZE bytes.
> +        if hash_section.len() != FSP_HASH_SIZE {
> +            dev_err!(
> +                dev,
> +                "FMC hash section size {} != expected {}\n",
> +                hash_section.len(),
> +                FSP_HASH_SIZE
> +            );
> +            return Err(EINVAL);
> +        }
> +
> +        let mut signatures = KBox::new(
> +            FmcSignatures {
> +                hash384: [0; _],
> +                public_key: [0; _],
> +                signature: [0; _],
> +            },
> +            GFP_KERNEL,
> +        )?;

This construct may create the 816 bytes long `FmcSignatures` instance on
the stack, where space is at a premium. `KBox::init` guarantees in-place
initialization:

    let mut signatures = KBox::init(
        init!(FmcSignatures {
            hash384: [0; _],
            public_key: [0; _],
            signature: [0; _],
        }),
        )?;
        GFP_KERNEL,

And by chaining the initializer we can also avoid making `signatures`
mutable:

    let signatures = KBox::init(
        init!(FmcSignatures {
            hash384 <- Zeroable::init_zeroed(),
            public_key <- Zeroable::init_zeroed(),
            signature <- Zeroable::init_zeroed(),
        })
        .chain(|sigs| {
            // PANIC: src and dst lengths are both FSP_HASH_SIZE (verified above).
            sigs.hash384.copy_from_slice(hash_section);
            // PANIC: dst is sliced to src.len(); src.len() <= FSP_PKEY_SIZE per `get_section`.
            sigs.public_key[..pkey_section.len()].copy_from_slice(pkey_section);
            // PANIC: dst is sliced to src.len(); src.len() <= FSP_SIG_SIZE per `get_section`.
            sigs.signature[..sig_section.len()].copy_from_slice(sig_section);
            Ok(())
        }),
        GFP_KERNEL,
    )?;